Blind quantum computing with two almost identical states by Dunjko, Vedran & Kashefi, Elham
ar
X
iv
:1
60
4.
01
58
6v
1 
 [q
ua
nt-
ph
]  
6 A
pr
 20
16
Blind quantum computing with two almost identical states
Vedran Dunjko∗1 and Elham Kashefi2,3
1Institute for Theoretical Physics, University of Innsbruck, Technikerstraße 21, A-6020 Innsbruck,
Austria.
2School of Informatics, University of Edinburgh, 10 Crichton Street, Edinburgh EH8 9AB, United
Kingdom
3CNRS LTCI, Departement Informatique et Reseaux, Telecom ParisTech, Paris CEDEX 13, France.
August 28, 2018
Abstract
The question of whether a fully classical client can delegate a quantum computation
to an untrusted quantum server while fully maintaining privacy (blindness) is one of the
big open questions in quantum cryptography. Both yes and no answers have important
practical and theoretical consequences, and the question seems genuinely hard. The state-of-
the-art approaches to securely delegating quantum computation, without exception, rely on
granting the client modest quantum powers, or on additional, non-communicating, quantum
servers. In this work, we consider the single server setting, and push the boundaries of
the minimal devices of the client, which still allow for blind quantum computation. Our
approach is based on the observation that, in many blind quantum computing protocols, the
“quantum” part of the protocol, from the clients perspective, boils down to the establishing
classical-quantum correlations (independent from the computation) between the client and
the server, following which the steering of the computation itself requires only classical
communication.
Here, we abstract this initial preparation phase, specifically for the Universal Blind
Quantum Computation protocol of Broadbent, Fitzsimons and Kashefi. We identify suffi-
cient criteria on the powers of the client, which still allow for secure blind quantum compu-
tation. We work in a universally composable framework, and provide a series of protocols,
where each step reduces the number of differing states the client needs to be able to prepare.
As the limit of such reductions, we show that the capacity to prepare just two pure states,
which have an arbitrarily high overlap (thus are arbitrarily close to identical), suffices for
efficient and secure blind quantum computation.
1 Introduction
An important question in modern (quantum) cryptography asks whether a fully classical Alice
can securely delegate a quantum computation to an untrusted server Bob. The main two flavours
of security one is interested in are blindness – meaning Alice’s computation remains private and
hidden from Bob – and verifiability –meaning Alice has a mechanism which ensures the declared
output of the computation is indeed correct. An answer to this question would have obvious
practical consequences, but also a profound impact on computational complexity theory and
cryptography. To this day, no such protocol with a fully classical Alice, which allows delegating
all quantum computations while maintaining either verifiability or blindness, has been found.
Nonetheless, protocols exist in which one or both properties can be achieved, if Alice is allowed
modest quantum powers, or by utilizing multiple quantum servers (which cannot communicate).
Over the course of recent years, the envelope of such minimal additional requirements has been
pushed, both theoretically [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17], but also
experimentally [18, 19]. The typical improvements of interest include minimizing the size of
the overall quantum and/or classical communication, and simplifying Alice’s required quantum
devices, or the guarantees placed on them (in e.g. device-independent constructions).
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1
In this work, we focus on the blindness aspects of delegating quantum computation. While
the problem of classical verifiable delegated computation has well-known deep ties with com-
plexity theory, it is perhaps less widely known that the same holds for the big question of a fully
classical-Alice blind delegated quantum computing protocol as well.
In particular, both existance, and non-existance of perfectly blind classical-client delegated
computing protocols has highly non-trivial consequences in complexity theory, which may elu-
cidate why finding such protocols (or proving they cannot exist) should be a hard task. These
results, sketched out in this work, motivate us to approach the big question indirectly, and
consider the problem of minimizing the quantum powers of Alice, while maintaining blindness
in delegated quantum computation.
In our approach, we focus on the family of protocols originating from the Universal Blind
Quantum Computation (UBQC) protocol of Broadbent, Fitzsimons and Kashefi [3]. Common
to all these protocols is that the client first establishes a particular type of classical-quantum
(CQ) correlated state, either by utilizing its own powers, or through the help of a second server,
entangled, but not communicating with the first [3]. Following this, the entire computation
proceeds through just classical communication.
Here, we abstract this initial distribution phase as a fully defined functionality (in the sense
used in composable cryptography), in which case the analysis of minimal powers needed for
the rest of the protocol, reduces to the the minimal requirements for the implementation of
this simpler functionality. In the process, we identify the genuinely quantum properties of the
UBQC protocol central to its security.
While our approach cannot yield a secure fully classical protocol, as such schemes which
require quantum preparation, intuitively, must depend on some inherently quantum property,
it does allow us to push the limits further. In particular, in the UBQC protocol, Alice’s device,
roughly speaking, is capable of producing 8 distinct qubit states. As a first step, we show that
a weaker device, where Bob has more options to cheat, still suffices for perfect composable
blindness.
Next, we give a protocol which utilizes an analogous device, capable of producing only 4
states, and can be securely used as a sub-routine, substituting the 8 state preparation device,
while maintaining perfect security. This already implies that Alice capable of producing just 4
BB84-type states used in quantum key distribution [20] suffices. We note that 4 state protocols,
which achieve differing flavours of security, have already been reported [11, 16]. Our approach,
however, allows us to push the envelope further, and we give a protocol in which a device capable
of preparing just two states (unitarily equivalent to |0〉 and |+〉 = 1/√2(|0〉 + |1〉) which can,
again, securely be used as a substitute for the 4 state device. At this point, perfect security is no
longer maintainable, but we achieve the next best thing - exponential security. As the last step,
we show how this generalizes, and we show that for any fidelity F, no matter how large, there
exist two states |ψ〉 , |φ〉 , such that F ≤ | 〈ψ|φ〉|2, which can be used instead of the two states
|0〉 , |+〉 , while maintaining exponential security. In other words, we achieve blind quantum
computation, where Alice’s device can produce two pure states, which can be arbitrarily close
to identical. Note that in the limit of fully identical states, the overall protocol would be fully
classical.
1.1 Paper overview
For didactic purposes, we will start off by considering only the correlations which are established
between Alice and Bob during a run of a protocol. In cryptographic language, the security
definitions which arise from such analyses are “local” security definitions, and are not embedded
in a wider framework of security which places guarantees on how the protocol performs when
combined with other protocols. However, this will already suffice for us to place necessary criteria
on what the powers of Alice must be, in this preparation phase. Later, we transform all the local
results into a composable security framework, namely Abstract Cryptography [21, 22, 12, 23],
where all sufficiency statements are proven.
In Section 2 we cover the preliminaries for this work: basic notation, definitions pertaining
to delegated quantum computing protocols and a succinct description of the UBQC protocol,
and we describe the basic ideas behind composable security, tailored for our setting. Following
this, in Section 3, we sketch out some results regarding the implications the (non-)existance
of a blind quantum computing would have in complexity theory. Next, in Section 4 we study
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the necessary and sufficient correlations which must be established in the preparation phase of
UBQC, for the protocol to be blind. In Section 5 we abstract the notion of preparation devices,
and treat this preparation process from the perspective of composable security. We provide
a couple of functionalities which are more general than assumed in UBQC (they allow for a
broader variety of malevolent behaviour for a dishonest Bob), and prove they still suffice for a
composably blind UBQC protocol. As an illustration, we show that the two-server protocol of [3]
is perfectly composably secure. In the final Section 6 we use the established formalism to prove
that four, and then two states preparation (that is, a preparation in which Alice can generate
only two differing states), still suffice for secure blind quantum computation. We conclude with
a discussion section.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Basic notation
Throughout the paper we will use X/Z to denote the Pauli X/ Pauli Z gates, H denotes the
Hadamard gate, S denotes the phase gate such that SS = Z. The identity we denote with 1.
In general, with |±θ〉 we denote the state 1√
2
(|0〉± eiθ |1〉), where θ is an angle. With ctrl-Z we
dentoe the two-qubit controlled Z rotation: ctrl-Z = |0〉 〈0| ⊗ 1+ |1〉 〈1| ⊗ Z.
The notation A ≈ǫ B, if A and B are states, indicates A and B are ǫ-close in terms of the
trace distance, induced by the trace norm, so A ≈ǫ B ⇔ 1/2||A − B|| ≤ ǫ. If A and B are
CPTP maps, then A and B are ǫ-close in terms of the distance induced by the diamond norm
on maps.
For an operator M with ‖M‖ = Tr|M | = Tr
√
MM † we denote the trace norm. The
angles are typically denoted θ, and any arithmetic on angles is assumed to be modulo 2π, so in
particular for any two objects (operators, states, maps) O(θ) and O(θ + 2π) are identical.
2.2 Blind quantum computing and local security criteria
In this work we will consider both locally secure, and composably secure definitions pertaining
to delegated quantum computing. Here, for the most part, we adhere to the notation introduced
in [12].
2.2.1 Delegated quantum computing
In general, delegated quantum computing pertains to any two party protocol between Alice
(client) and Bob (server), where Alice evaluates some (quantum) computation using the help of
Bob. In general, any such process is captured by the following definition, which is adapted from
[12].
Definition 1. A two-party DQC protocol where Alice’s system is denoted A and Bob’s system
B, is modeled as a sequence of CPTP maps {Ei : L(HAC)→ L(HAC)}Ni=1 and {Fi : L(HCB)→
L(HCB)}N−1i=1 , which Alice and Bob apply sequentially to their respective systems and the com-
munication channel C (which is initially in the state |0〉). The initial state of Alice’s and Bob’s
system we will denote ψAB and the final state, after the last maps of both players have been
implemented with ρAB = DQC(ψAB).
For example, in the first round Alice applies E1 to the joint system AC, and sends C to Bob,
who applies F1 to CB, and returns C to Alice. Then she applies E2, etc. In the last round Alice
applies EN .
The minimal requirement for such a protocol to be useful is that it is correct. In the local
security setting (as opposed to a composable security setting), correctness is a statement about
the joint state of Alice and Bob ρAB:
Definition 2. A DQC protocol (with initial state ψAB), defined by maps {Ei}Ni=1 and {Fi}N−1i=1 ,
where the initial state of Alice’s system ψA = TrB(ψAB) contains Alice’s desired input and
the description of her computation is correct if when both parties play honestly ( i.e. apply the
maps {Ei}Ni=1 and {Fi}N−1i=1 sequentially) the state of Alice’s system at the end of the protocol
ρA = TrB(ρAB) contains the state generated by applying the computation described in ψA to the
initial state also given in ψA.
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Of particular interest for this work, are protocols which also guarantee blindness, intuitively
capturing the idea that the server learns nothing about the computation Alice evaluated. In the
local setting, the relevant definition is given as follows [12]:
Definition 3. A DQC protocol provides local ǫ-blindness, if, for every adversarial behavior
{Fi}i, there exists a CPTP map F : L(HB) → L(HB), such that for all initial states ψAB
(which, along with the defined adversarial behaviour, induces the final state ρAB) it holds that
TrA(ρAB) ≈ǫ F(TrA(ψAB)). (1)
The definition above captures the idea that, if a protocol is blind, then whatever the state
of Bob’s register is at the end of the protocol, given some initial state, the final state of Bob’s
register is such that Bob could have generated it locally, without ever engaging with Alice, from
the initial state alone. In all the definitions we assume that any purification of the initial states
are contained in the register of Bob.
This definition is, when applied specifically to UBQC, and in the case of ǫ = 0 equivalent to
the original definition of blindness in [3].
2.2.2 Universal blind quantum computing
Universal blind quantum computing (UBQC) [3] is a two-party quantum protocol, founded on
the framework of measurement-based quantum computation [24]. In it, Alice capable only of
producing single qubit states in the state |+θ〉 = 1/
√
2(|0〉 + eiθ |1〉), for the 8 angles {θ =
lπ/4}7l=0. We will often refer to this set as “the 8 state set”.
In general, blind quantum computing protocols come in 4 flavours, depending on whether
the input (output) is classical or quantum. In this work, we focus on the classical input- classical
output versions, but the protocols provided are given for the general quantum input-quantum
output setting.
In UBQC, Alice initially sends M qubits, randomly chosen in the set of 8 states to Bob,
and records their state. Honest Bob entangles the qubits in the so-called brickwork state (see
[3]) - the resulting state is universal for measurement based quantum computing. From that
point on the UBQC protocol requires classical communication (specifying the measurement
angles applied by Bob, and the corresponding measurement outcomes) only, barring perhaps
the quantum output.
The protocol is given in Protocol 1, and has been proven to be perfectly correct and perfectly
blind in both local settings [3], and in the full composable sense [12], which we elaborate on
next.
2.3 Composable security
Local security definitions typically consider an abstracted protocol, and pose criteria on the
form and structure of the (joint) states of the registers of all players involved in a protocol. In
some cases it may be clear what the ‘correct’ definition/criterion should be. However, more
often, understanding what happens when such a locally secure protocol is embedded in a larger
scheme (or simply is not viewed in isolation from the rest of the universe), may be difficult,
counterintuitive, and usually requires additional analyses for every such larger scheme calling a
protocol as a subroutine.
Composable security has by now some 20 years of history, and three approaches have been
typically used, and have also been extended to the quantum setting: the Universal Composability
(UC) framework [25, 26, 27] (originally by Canetti), the Reactive Simulability (RS) framework
[28, 29, 30, 31] (originally by Backes, Pfitzmann and Waidner), and the Abstract Cryptography
(AC) framework [21, 22, 23], developed by Maurer and Renner. In the approaches of UC and
RS, the formalism is built bottom-up, first formally defining the smallest building blocks of any
network of protocols, at the level of Turing machines and channels. In contrast, AC is a top-down
approach, which considers very abstract objects first, proves theorems at this level, and then
proceeds to instantiate into particular objects (such as quantum maps and quantum channels)
when needed. AC is in this sense more general, and UC/RS can be realized by instantiating
the abstract objects of AC as the systems used in UC/RS. It is, however, not our goal to give
a formal description of how these approaches work, but rather to give a basic flavour of what
composability is about. Following this we will only state the operative definition of security
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Protocol 1 Universal Blind Quantum Computation
Alice’s input:
• An n−qubit unitary map U , represented as a sequence of measurement angles {φx,y} of a
one-way quantum computation over a brickwork state of the size n× (m+ 1), along with
the X and Z dependency sets Dx,y, D
′
x,y, respectively.
• An n-qubit input state ρin
Alice’s output (for an honest Bob):
• The n−qubit quantum state ρout = UρinU †
The protocol
1. State preparation
1.1. For each x ∈ [n], Alice applies X ixZθx,0 to the xth qubit of the input ρin, where the
binary values ix and the angles θx,0 ∈ {kπ/4}7k=0 are chosen uniformly at random
for each x. This is equivalent to encrypting the input with a quantum one-time pad.
The result is sent to Bob.
1.2. If ix = 1, Alice updates the measurement angles φx,0 and φx,1 to compensate for the
introduced bit flip, see [3] for details.
1.3. For each column y ∈ [m−1], and each row x ∈ [n], Alice prepares the state ∣∣+θx,y〉 :=
1√
2
(|0〉+ eiθx,y |1〉), where the defining angle θx,y ∈ {kπ/4}7k=0 is chosen uniformly at
random, and sends the qubits to Bob.
1.4. Bob creates n qubits in the |+〉 state, which are used as the final output layer, and
entangles the qubits received from Alice and this final layer by applying ctrl-Z op-
erators between the pairs of qubits specified by the pattern of the brickwork state
Gn×(m+1).
2. Interaction and measurement
For y = 0, . . . ,m− 1, repeat
For x = 1, . . . , n, repeat
2.1. Alice computes the updated measurement angle φ′x,y, which depends on previous
measurement outcomes Bob reported, and random choices (rx,y below) of Alice, see
[3] for details.
2.2. Alice chooses a binary digit rx,y ∈ {0, 1} uniformly at random, and computes δx,y =
φ′x,y + θx,y + πrx,y.
2.3. Alice transmits δx,y to Bob, who performs a measurement in the basis
{∣∣+δx,y〉 , ∣∣−δx,y〉}.
2.4. Bob transmits the result sx,y ∈ {0, 1} to Alice.
2.5. If rx,y = 1, Alice flips sx,y; otherwise she does nothing.
3. Output Correction
3.1. Bob sends to Alice all qubits in the last (output) layer.
3.2. Alice performs the final Pauli corrections {ZsZx,mXsXx,m}nx=1 on the received output
qubits.
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for two-party delegated computing protocols, as this is all we require for this work - in our
case, the UC and the AC definitions are equivalent, so we will not have to be specific about
the model we use. The minimal description of how AC is instantiated for the case of delegated
quantum computing protocols is given in [12], and we refer the interested reader to this work,
or to previously given references for further details.
The main idea behind composable security, is to define security by an appropriate notion
of process identity. Specifically, a security definition consists of a full characterization of a
(quantum) map with memory, which may have many distinct ‘input/output ports’ (which, e.g.
partition the Hilbert space of the input systems, and typically assign them to individual players).
The characterization is given in terms of its input-output behavior only, and we refer to such
maps as ideal functionalities or resources.
However, most interesting resources are non-trivial, and do not correspond to (physical)
resources we typically have at hand. In this case the basic idea behind composability is to use
other resources (which we do have) to construct the resource we wish to have. The prescription
of how available resources are combined to realize another resource is called a protocol. Thus
protocols turn resources into other resources.
Composability frameworks then provide a method for establishing a similarity/identity be-
tween processes, specifically between the overall action realized by using some protocol (which
uses some simple resources), and the action of the ideal functionality we wish to have.
The main idea behind composability frameworks is that such a relation can be chosen as to
preserve arbitrary nestings, while capturing any notion of secutiy. Assume that some protocol
π, which uses some set of, perhaps very complicated, resources R is process-similar to an ideal
functionality S. The latter defines what security means, thus this sentence can be read as “π
is a secure protocol, if we use ideal resources R”. The composability criterion then asks when
can we substitute the complicated resources with sub-protocols (which use simpler resources),
while maintaining the overall process similarity with S. Another way to phrase this question is
“Is π still secure if we use sub-protocols instead of complicated ideal resources R?”. The main
theorems of composability frameworks then guarantee that this will be the case as long as the
sub-protocols themselves are similar to the complicated resources, under the same similarity
relation. This formalizes the intuitive notion of composability: “The protocol where we use
sub-protocols instead of complicated ideal resources R is secure, as long as the sub-protocols are
themselves secure”.
In other words, if one always proves security of some protocol by defining an ideal resource,
and establishing such a process similarity, then one can always analyse new protocols by just
assuming the (more complex) ideal resources. Then we do not need to worry about the the
details of how they themselves are actually implemented. Such abstraction is, generally, not
possible if the security definitions are just local.
A simple example of a useful resource (on purpose chosen outside of an obvious cryptographic
context) may be a two-party ideal quantum channel. In this case, the corresponding resource
(the channel) has two ports/interfaces, which we can label Alice and Bob. On the first port it
accepts a quantum state ρ from Alice, and then it outputs the state ρ on the Bob-interface (or
port).
In practice however, the channels are never ideal and quite noisy and in fact the fidelity is
typically bounded below by some constant. This problem is usually resolved by error correction:
Alice first encodes her state in an error correcting code, sends this through the channel, and the
original state is recovered by Bob. In the language of the AC framework we would say that the
error correcting protocol π = (πA, πB), where πA and πB characterize the local actions of Alice
and Bob as stipulated by an error correction algorithm, constructs (within ǫ) the ideal channel
Rideal from the resource of the noisy channel Rnoisy, when everybody behaves correctly.
The ǫ arises as the construction is not perfect as even with very thick error correction, in
principle, small errors can still occur. What this captures is that the concatenated processes
πARnoisyπB (that is, the using of the noisy channel, prepended by the process realized by Alice’s
encoding protocol on Alice’s interface, and appended by Bob’s decoding on Bob’s interface side)
is close to the ideal process Rideal. Note the protocols πA, πB are also input-output specified
processes. In particular, the input to πA is a quantum state, and the output is the encoding
of the input. The output of the concatenated process πARnoisy is the encoded state which has
undergone noise. The input (on the interface connected to the channel) of πB is an encoded
state, and the output (on the Bob-interface) is the decoded state.
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There are many notions of distance one could consider here (and indeed this is done on a
very abstract level in AC), but in concrete settings (and in this paper) one considers “the distin-
guishing advantage”. That is, two resources are ǫ−close, if a third entity, called a distinguisher,
having access to all the interfaces of one of the two resources, under optimal strategy, has at
most 1/2 + ǫ probability of correctly deciding which resource he is interacting with. When the
functionalities are CPTP maps, the distinguishing advantage is given by the diamond norm on
the CPTP maps.
What we have discussed thus far is how to express what happens when all players (Alice and
Bob) are honest – that is, what happens if Alice and Bob really run the protocols πA and πB .
In cryptographic settings, but also in real settings where things are imperfect and can fail, it
may be the case that one (or both) of the players are dishonest or simply fail, which must also
be covered by the framework. To formalize such events, every ideal resource usually explicitly
separates dishonest and honest usage: each interface of the resource has a so-called “corruption
bit” c which can be set by a player to 0 or 1. If c = 0, then the interface allows only honest
activities. If c = 1 then additional functionalities of the resource may be opened up, accessible
only to a dishonest player, and these are again fully specified.
To illustrate this setting we will now move to a slightly more complicated example, central to
this paper - the functionality of ideal blind quantum computing denoted SB. The resource SB is
also a two-player functionality, which takes an input from Alice (a specification of a computation,
and perhaps a quantum input ψA). It was first formally defined in [12] as follows:
Definition 4. The ideal DQC resource SB , which provides both correctness and blindness, takes
an input ψA, U at Alice’s interface. Bob’s filtered interface has a control bit c, set by default to
0, which a dishonest Bob can flip to activate the other functionalities. If Bob sets c = 0, SB
takes no input from Bob, and produces no output on Bob’s side. It produces the honest output
U(ψA) at Alice’s interface. This corresponds to the honest play by Bob. If c = 1, Bob’s interface
outputs the allowed leak, here the size of the computation, and accepts two further inputs from
Bob: a state ψB and a description of a completely-positive trace-preserving map E. The resource
then outputs E (ψAB), at the interface of Alice.
In the above definition, we do not assume that the input state of Alice ψA is in tensor product
with the system held by Bob – if it is, the output given to Alice, in the dishonest case, could be
written as E (ψA ⊗ ψB) . The corrupt functionalities model the fact that in blind-only protocols
Bob can always interfere and mess up Alice’s computation, as there is no mechanism for the
verification of the output. But note that, regardless of the activities of Bob, nothing except the
pemitted leak is ever output on his interface - so the ideal functionality above captures blindness.
Now, the UBQC protocol we have described in the previous section realizes the functionality
SB, more specifically, it constructs SB, from the resources of just quantum channels and classical
channels. If Bob is honest, and blindly runs his side of the protocol (deleting all the systems he
used in the process afterward) it is clear that the input-output behavior of the real protocol is
identical to the input-output behavior of SB. Formally, we write
πARchannelsπB = SB⊥B, (2)
where π = (πA, πB) is the UBQC protocol (including Bob’s deletion of his register at the end)
and ⊥B is the (almost tivial) protocol which just sets the corrupt bit c of SB to zero. The
statement above is the correctness statement of the protocol in the AC language, and the exact
equality means that no distinguisher can tell apart the process πARchannelsπB from SB⊥B by
having access to just the defined (Bob’s and Alice’s) interfaces. Naturally, the strict equality
can be substituted with an approximate equality.
However, if Bob is dishonest, this is manifestly not the case: in the case of the real protocol
UBQC, Bob’s side collects all the systems Alice sends in the protocol, whereas in the ideal case,
he only gets the permitted leak. These settings are trivial to tell apart.
Here is where the notion of the simulator (in UC) or converter (in AC) comes into play. The
simulator is simply a protocol which, from an outside point of view, makes the ideal protocol
look like the real one, which, critically, has access only to the interface of the corrupt player.
In the two player case we are considering, when only Bob can be dishonest, the simulator
σB is an interface between the Bob’s interface of SB and Bob himself - this gives rise to the
functionality SBσB . We will say the protocol π securely constructs SB from some other resources
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(classical and quantum channels) if there exists a simulator σB such that
πARchannels = SBσB (3)
where again the equality may be substituted by an approximate equality.
Note, in above, we have removed Bob’s part of the protocol on the left-hand side of the
expression, which designates that we no longer specify what Bob may do. In the context of
UBQC, the left hand side guarantees that Alice sends all the qubits to Bob, and responds to
whatever Bob may send back, but says nothing about what Bob is actually locally doing. This,
implicitly, takes care of the quantifier over all possible activities of Bob which arise in local
definitions (parts of security statements stating that “for all activities of Bob” some criterion
holds). Vitally, the simulator σB only communicates with Bob’s side of the interface, so in
particular, it has no direct access to Alice’s input, aside from what the ideal functionality may
provide. This also means that whatever information about Alice’s input Bob could have accessed
by being malicious in the real protocol, he could equally access in the ideal protocol, by simply
running the simulator σB , internally. Thus, intuitively speaking, the real protocol “is at least as
secure” as the ideal functionality, as a malicious Bob may choose to run the simulator, but is not
limited to it. This constitutes the asymmetric cryptographic “process identity” relation in AC
we mentioned earlier is defined as follows: a real protocol is process-similar to an ideal protocol
if 1) the correctness expression (Eq. (2)) holds, and if there exists a simulator, which makes
the ideal protocol look like the real one, where we make no assumptions on what Bob does (Eq.
(3)). The joint statement that both correctness and security are achieved using protocol π we
write as
R
π,ǫ−→ S, (4)
which is read “the protocol π constructs the resource S from the resource R, within error ǫ”,
and stands as an abbreviation for the formal statements:
πARπB ≈ǫ S⊥B (correctness) (5)
∃σB , s.t. πAR ≈ǫ SσB (security). (6)
The generalization to more complex protocols with multiple players are natural, and we demand
the existance of simulators for all players which may be dishonest, and we refer the reader to
[23] for more details on the general framework which shows how AC is instatntiated in the full
quantum setting. We will often abreviate the notation R
π,ǫ−→ S with
R −→ S, (7)
where in the latter we mean that there exists a protocol realising the construction, where the
actual protocol and the error will be clear from context.
In this paper we will only be considering two-player protocols, where only Bob is assumed
to be malicious. As the first step we will show that
MRSP (8), Rcc
π,ǫ=0−→ SB, (8)
whereRcc are classical channels, andMRSP functionality is an abstraction, and a generalization,
of Alice’s capacity to produce and send the eight qubit states as in the UBQC protocol. It is
a generalization in the sense that a dishonest Bob can use it to generate a more general class
of classical-quantum correlations than what just direct qubit sending would allow. The formal
statement above states such a functionality still suffices for secure blind quantum computing.
Then, we will define ever simpler ideal functionalities MRSP (4) (using 4 states) and SP (2)
(using 2 states) and prove
MRSP (4)→MRSP (8) and SP (2)→MRSP (4). (9)
By the composition theorems of AC, we will then have SP (2) → SB , where SP (2) requires
Alice to produce just two non-orthogonal quantum states (we assume classical channels are
always available so we sometimes do not specify them as a required resource explicitly). All
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constructions are with zero error, except SP (2)→ MRSP (4), where the error is exponentially
small in the security parameter.
The paradigm for security is always as follows: we first identify and fully characterise the
desired ideal resource. Then we provide an actual protocol, and prove correctness, which just
means that if Bob is honest the output is exactly what we want (Eq. (5)). Lastly we prove
security, which means we explicitly construct a simulator, which makes the ideal protocol in-
distinguishable from the real protocol (Eq. (6)), when we make no assumptions on what the
distinguisher does to find out which functionality, the real or the simulated, he is facing. Since
all the protocols we will encounter are two-round, we will be able to reduce the distinguishing
advantage measure to the trace distance on the final states of the real and simulated protocols.
3 Connections between blind computing and complexity
theory
The interest in the classical limits of blind quantum computing, especially in its verifiable variant,
has been long standing. The capacity to perform universal, and verifiable quantum computation
would yield an affirmative answer to the long standing question of Gottesman, Vazirani and
Aaronson [32, 33] (GAV), which asked whether one can verify the computation run by a quantum
server, using only a classical prover – formally, whether interactive proof systems, where the
prover is limited to BPP, contain the class BQP. Much of the recent interest in blind quantum
computing has been motivated from this perspective.
What is less known (but still established in the narrow scientific community), is that the
question of whether just blind (and not verifiable) blind quantum computation is possible with
a classical client (the CUBQC question), has independent connections to complexity theory.
Note, the two questions are independent, unless it is proven that any (also classical) blind
quantum computing protocol can be lifted to a verifiable protocol, or in reverse, that verifiability
automatically implies blindness.
To understand what the possible implications of the (non-)existance of a CUBQC protocol
may have, we roughly sketch out what such protocols constitute. We assume a client and a
server, connected by a classical channel. The client is given as input a description of a unitary
U (perhaps in the form of its circuit) over N qubits, and the client is to use the server to come
up with the measurement outcome of one of the qubits of U |0¯〉 where |0¯〉 is some fiducial, say
“all-zero”, state. Moreover, we can promise that the outcome (which may be probabilistic) is
either 0 with probability above 2/3 or 1 with probability above 2/3 [4], as this promise problem
is BQP -complete.
The client engages in an interaction with the server, where the messages of the client may
depend on the input and random bits, generated by the protocol. The server responds to the
messages of the client round by round. In the case of an honest server, after at most poly(N)
rounds of communication (each round having at most poly(N) bits), the client obtains the
answer with bounded error. Importantly, the only thing the server learns (independent of its
behavior) is the allowed leak, that is, the bound on the size of the computation poly(N).
Some implications are trivial. First, if BQP = BPP then such a protocol exists: the
client computes the outcome herself, and sends gibberish to the server. By considering the
contraposition of this example, we obtain the first simple observation:
Lemma 5. If a CUBQC protocol, where the client is restricted to some computational class C
(say BPP), does not exist, then C 6= BQP (so BPP 6= BQP ).
Thus proving the non-existance of the protocol may be non-trivial, as it would immediately
separate the classes BPP and BQP, unless additional restrictions are imposed.
Under certain conditions, the opposite result, establishing the existence of a CUBQC proto-
col, also has non-trivial consequences. The main results supporting this, have been established
in the paper [34], where the authors study the problem of hiding information from an oracle.
They consider two-party protocols which are called (efficient) Generalized Encryption Schemes,
which assume deterministic encryption and decryption algorithms E and D, a randomized key-
sampling algorithm k(·).
Definition 6. (Generalized Encryption Scheme [34]) A generalized encryption scheme (GES)
for a function f , given input x ∈ Dom(f), is a two-party protocol with the following properties:
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1. There are m rounds of communication. Denote A’s ith message by ai and B’s i
th message
by bi.
2. On cleartext input x, A computes an encryption key k = k(x) before she initiates commu-
nication with B. This one key is used by A in each round and in decryption.
3. The encryption algorithm E takes inputs of the form (x, k, b¯), where x ∈ Dom(f), k ∈ K,
and b¯ is a list of elements of the set B (set of Bob’s messages), and produces outputs in A
(set of Alice’s messages). In round i of the protocol, A computes ai = E(x, k, b¯) and sends
it to B; the list b¯ must be of length i − 1 and consist of B’s responses b1, . . . , bi−1 to A’s
previous queries. Thus, in round 1, the list b¯ is empty, and the query a, is a function of
x and k.
4. B draws his responses b1, ldots, bm from any distribution over B which satisfies the property
below.
5. The decryption algorithm D takes inputs of the form (x, k, b¯), where b¯ is a list ofm elements
of B. If k and b¯ are the results of an execution of the protocol, then D(x, k, b¯) = f(x) with
probability at leastl/2 + 1/|x|c, for some constant c.
6. A GES is efficient if E, D terminate in polynomial time, and k(·) terminates in expected
polynomial time, we can check in polynomial time whether a particular key k is valid for
a cleartext instance x, and the sizes of k(x), m and all the messages are polynomial in the
input size |x|.
The main result of the paper [34] is the following:
Theorem 1. If the boolean satisfiability problem SAT allows a GES (that is, in the terminology
of the definition, x is a boolean formula and f(x) is a statement about its satisfiability), while
leaking just a function of the size of the input, then the polynomial hierarchy collapses to the
third level.
The setting of GES is not identical to the setting of CUBQC. In CUBQC, we assume that
the server is a quantum machine, capable of computing the class BQP . In the setting of GES,
however, there is no assumption on the power of the server. Note that the definitions of GES
specify the characteristics of Alice’s part of the protocol. Specifically, we may ask the question
of existence of GES for SAT, where the server is not omnipotent, but bounded to polynomially-
sized quantum computation. If we require information-theoretic security, and no leak aside from
the size, then any GES where the server is bounded to BQP is also a valid GES where the server
is not bounded. This implies that
Corollary 1. If the boolean satisfiability problem SAT allows a GES (that is, in the terminology
of the definition, x is a boolean formula and f(x) is a statement about its satisfiability) where
the server is bounded to BQP computations, while leaking just a function of the size of the input
against an unbounded server, then the polynomial hierarchy collapses to the third level.
Another distinction between CUBQC protocols and GES, is that GES can be specialized for
a given function f , where CUBQC is intended to be universal. For this, we can define UGES,
with the same specification as GES, where we provide f as an input as well - in other words, in
the definition of GES, we substitute x with (f(·), x).
Suppose now that there exists a CUBQC, which is information-theoretically secure, leaks
just the size of the input, and the actions of Alice are limited to the specification of UGES,
and is capable of securely computing any BQP function. Then there exists a GES with a
BQP-bounded server, capable of computing any BQP function with the same leak, which is
also information theoretically secure (this is just an instatiation of UGES where f is fixed).
Moreover, since it is information-theoretically secure, it is secure when the server is unbounded.
This means that here exists a GES capable of computing any BQP function.
Thus we have the following observation:
Corollary 2. If there exists an information-theoretically secure CUBQC (where Alice is re-
stricted to the behavior as in UGES), capable of computing any BQP function, while leaking
just the size of computation, then
If BQP ⊇ NP, then PH collapses to the 3rd level, (10)
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where PH stands for the polynomial hierarchy, which to our knowledge would be a new
result answering to the affirmative the question posed in [35]. This alone suggests that secure
blind protocols for the CUBQC setting may be hard to find, but we note that the result above
assumes perfect security, and a slightly restricted behavior on the side of Alice (as in GES).
However, the restrictions on Alice are slight: note that the function k can serve as a source of
polynomial-sized randomness, which can effectively turn the algorithms E and D to randomized
algorithms. Moreover, as stated, the protocol seems to assume that E does not take the queries
of Alice as inputs. But, the specification does not preclude that either E re-generates all previous
queries, or that the queries of Alice are contained in Bob’s responses as well. Thus the only
important source of restrictions comes in that the function k(·) is in the class ZPP which could
be be generalized to BPP, and it is not clear whether the main theorem would still hold.
The results of this section motivate the general question of whether a classical client UBQC
protocol is possible. In this work, we will tackle the more humble question of realizing UBQC
using quantum devices on the side of Alice, but where the devices are further restricted than
previously proposed.
4 The CQ correlations in UBQC
In the classical input/output UBQC, the only quantum phase of the protocol is Alice’s prepara-
tion - Alice has to prepare and send a bunch of qubits in the state |+θ〉 where the phase angle
θ ∈ {kπ/4}7k=0 = Θ is chosen uniformly at random. Similarly, for a verifiable variant of UBQC
the set of states Alice has to be able to produce is just augmented by the two Pauli-Z eigenstates.
Alice’s capacity to produce such states is a statement about the required classical-quantum cor-
relations of the joint Alice - Bob system which are sufficient for (verifiable) UBQC. This we can
formalize by introducing a third party - Charlie the state preparator. In the first step of the
UBQC protocol, Charlie prepares the following initial state of Alice’s and Bob’s system:
σAB =
N⊗
i=1
(∑
θi∈Θ
1/8 |θi〉 〈θi| ⊗ |+θi〉 〈+θi |
)
(11)
The states {|θ〉}θ∈Θ span an 8-dimensional subspace of Alice’s register, and signify classical
information, i.e. 〈θ′ |θ〉 = 0 ⇐⇒ θ′ 6= θ, and N is the size of Alice’s desired computation.
From this point, the protocol would follow the steps of original UBQC, and clearly the
protocol with Charlie the state preparator would be equally (locally) secure. Since the original
UBQC protocol is blind for every action of Bob, it follows that if Charlie himself cheats, and
prepares the state
σ
{E}i
AB =
N⊗
i=1
(∑
θi∈Θ
1/8 |θi〉 〈θi| ⊗ Ei(|+θi〉 〈+θi|)
)
(12)
where the CPTP maps Ei were chosen by Bob, the resulting protocol would still be blind (albeit
not necessarily correct) 1. Focusing on individual states, the sufficient correlations then attain
the form
σEAB−single =
∑
θ∈Θ
1/8 |θ〉 〈θ| ⊗ E(|+θ〉 〈+θ|) (14)
1In the expression above, we assume Bob/Charlie’s deviation is separable, however blindness would equally
hold in the case of a coherent deviation, where the realized joint state is of the form
σ
E
AB = (1A ⊗ EB)
N⊗
i=1

∑
θi∈Θ
|θi〉 〈θi|︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
⊗
∣∣+θi
〉 〈
+θi
∣∣
︸ ︷︷ ︸
B

 . (13)
In this note we investigate the characteristics of the simplest apparatus Alice may use and still achieve blindness,
so we focus on properties of individual states. We note, however, that the reduced density matrix obtained
by tracing out all but one individual system in the expression above again generates individual states with the
correlations given by Eq. (14).
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Similarly, for verifiable UBQC [5], Charlie would generate such correlations with the only differ-
ence that a certain number2 of subsystems are characterized with the correlation
1∑
b=0
1/2 |Zb〉 〈Zb| ⊗ |b〉 〈b| , (15)
such that 〈Zb| θ〉 = 0, ∀θ, b and 〈Z0|Z1〉 = 0. where blindness is again ensured as long the
deviation from the ideal correlations is characterized by a CPTP map acting on Bob’s register
only (as it corresponds to a possible deviation by Bob at the very first step of the protocol).
The sufficiency of establishing the correlations of the type in Eq. (12) has already been used
in [6] to provide a coherent state UBQC protocol through a coherent state remote blind qubit
state preparation sub-protocol.
The correlations of the type given in Eq. (14), perhaps with the additional states required for
the verifiable protocol as explained above, suffice for obtaining a verifiable protocol of the type
given in [5]. We will call such correlations correlations for verifiable UBQC (sometimes strong
correlations), as these types of correlations are sufficient for both blindness and verifiablity.
4.1 Necessary individual correlations for blindness
While the individual correlations given in Eq. (12) are sufficient for blindness of UBQC, they
are not necessary. The following Theorem gives the characterization of necessary and sufficient
individual correlations for blind UBQC:
Theorem 2. A UBQC protocol, with classical input with computation of size N where the
preparation stage, in which Alice emits her pre-rotated qubits, is replaced by initializing a part
of the joint system of Alice and Bob to N states σiAB is blind if and only if the states σ
i
AB are
of the following form:
σiAB =
1
|Θ|
∑
θi∈Θ
|θi〉 〈θi| ⊗ ρθii , (16)
where it holds that
1. ρθ is a normalized quantum state (trace one positive operator), for all θ, and
2. ρθ + ρθ+π = ρθ
′
+ ρθ
′+π for all θ, θ′,
3. |Θ| is the size of the set Θ, typically 8.
In other words, for all θ, ρθ+ρθ+π = 2ηi where ηi is some fixed quantum state. The correlations
of the type given in Eq. (16) we will call weak correlations, or correlations for blindness.
Proof. Sufficiency:
Following the steps proof of stand alone blindness of UBQC given in [36], for all deviations
Bob may implement, the state of Bob’s register at the end of the computation can be written
as:
N
∑
r
∑
θ
∑
b
Eb
(
N⊗
i=1
(
ρθi ⊗ δi(b, r, θi, φi)
)
⊗ ψB
)
(17)
where
• b, r, θ and φ denote the vectors of lengthN comprising Bob’s classical responses throughout
the protocol, the random bits r chosen by Alice, the random angles θ coming from the
initial pre-set correlations, and Alice’s computational angles,
• ψB denotes the initial state of Bob’s system
2This number depends on the desired verifiability levels of verifiable UBQC, and it is proportional to the
number of testing qubits, called trap qubits, which are used in verifiable UBQC to monitor the acitivities of Bob.
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• Eb denote completely positive trace non-increasing maps Bob implements depending on
the declared measurement outcomes he sends to Alice
• for a label X we abbreviate |X〉 〈X | with X , so with δi(b, r, θi, φi) we denote the
classical measurement angles Alice sends to Bob throughout the protocol, which may
depend on all parameters.
• N denotes the normalization factor 2−(4N) corresponding to the number of Alice’s possible
choices of r and θ parameters.
Since CP maps are linear, the expression above rewrites as:
N
∑
b
Eb

∑
r,θ
(
N⊗
i=1
(
ρθi ⊗ δi(b, r, θi, φi)
))
⊗ ψB

 , (18)
and to prove the sufficiency of the theorem, it will suffice to show that
∑
r,θ
(
N⊗
i=1
(
ρθi ⊗ δi(b, r, θi, φi)
))
(19)
is an operator independent from the computational angles.
To show this, we will use the following lemma:
Lemma 7. Let δ(θ, r) = φ + θ + rπ (mod 2π), for a fixed angle φ, be a measurement angle as
appearing in UBQC, and ρθ be a state such that ρθ + ρθ+π = 2η for all θ and some fixed state
η (independent of θ). Then ∑
θ,r
ρθ ⊗ δ(θ, r) = 2η ⊗ 1. (20)
Proof. We prove this lemma by reshuffling the elements of the sum. Note that we have, for all
φ, that δ(θ, 0) = δ(θ + π, 1), so the sum above rewrites as
3π/4∑
θ=0
(ρθ + ρθ+π)⊗
(
δ(θ, 0) + δ(θ, 1)
)
= 2η ⊗
∑
θ
(
δ(θ, 0)
)
= 2η ⊗ 1 (21)
Now we return to the evaluation of the expression
∑
r,θ
(
N⊗
i=1
(
ρθi ⊗ δi(b, r, θi, φi)
))
(22)
Note that, for a fixed sequence of Bob’s responses b we can, by the definition of the angles
δ, introduce a substitution of variables by introducing the variables r′i = (ri + bi) mod 2. This
corresponds to the fact that, in the UBQC protocol, Alice internally flips her hidden r parameters
depending on the response of Bob. In these new variables, the angles δ only depend on r′ which
are still distributed uniformly at random. The expression above then becomes
∑
r′,θ
(
N⊗
i=1
(
ρθi ⊗ δi(r′, θi, φi)
))
(23)
Note that the last r′ variable r′N only appears in the angle δN , and the variable θi only appears
in the corresponding angle δi. So we can break up the sum above as:
∑
r′
1
,...r′
N−1
,θ1,...θN−1
N−1⊗
i=1
(
ρθi ⊗ δi(r′, θi, φi)
)
⊗

 ∑
r′
N
,θN
ρθN ⊗ δN(r′, θN , φN )

 (24)
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However, by Lemma 7, and the assumptions of the Theorem we have that∑
r′
N
,θN
ρθN ⊗ δN (r′, θN , φN ) = 2ηN ⊗ 1. (25)
Since, for every i the modified computational angle φ′i appearing in δi only depends on r
′
j
parameters where j < i, the process of eliminating the last remaining angle δ, as shown for δN
above, continues inductively until we obtain
∑
r′,θ
(
N⊗
i=1
(
ρθi ⊗ δi(r′, θi, φi)
))
=
N⊗
i=1
(2ηi ⊗ 1) . (26)
by plugging this into expression in (18) we get that the state of Bob’s register is:
N
∑
b
Eb
(
N⊗
i=1
(2ηi ⊗ 1)⊗ ψB ,
)
= E(ψB), (27)
for some CPTP map E . That is the protocol is stand-alone perfectly blind.
Necessity:
For a protocol to be blind, it should be blind for every size of the computation, in particular
for the computation of size N = 1, and also in the case when, as his first step, Bob deletes
all information in his register except the initial correlations. Then the reduced state of Bob’s
system is given with: ∑
θ
ρθ. (28)
As the next step of the protocol, Alice sends her first and only measurement angle δ(θ, r, φ) =
φ+ θ + rπ mod 2π, and Bob’s reduced state updates to∑
θ,r
ρθ ⊗ δ(θ, r, φ) , (29)
up to an irrelevant normalization factor, where Alice’s secret measurement angle is φ. In order
for the protocol to be stand alone blind (or composably blind, for that matter), the state above
must not depend on φ. The sum above can still be reshuffled, since δ(θ, 0, φ) = δ(θ+ π, 1, φ), to
obtain
ρφ =
3π/4∑
θ=0
(ρθ + ρθ+π)⊗
(
δ(θ, 0, φ) + δ(θ, 1, φ)
)
. (30)
Note that the operators δ(θ, 0, φ) + δ(θ, 1, φ) and δ(θ, 0, φ′) + δ(θ, 1, φ′) have orthogonal
support unless φ = φ′ or φ = φ′ + π, so it can be shown that if ρφ = ρφ′ for all φ, φ′ then
ρθ+ρθ+π = ρθ
′
+ρθ
′+π for all θ, θ′. Thus, the criterion of the Theorem is necessary for (perfect)
blindness as well.
We emphasize that the weak correlations defined in Theorem 2 are strictly weaker than
the strong correlations defined in Eq. (14). Note first that strong correlations also satisfy the
condition for weak correlations as
E(|+θ〉 〈+θ|) + E(|+θ+π〉 〈+θ+π|) = E(|+θ〉 〈+θ|+ |+θ+π〉 〈+θ+π|) = E(1), ∀θ. (31)
However, the converse is not true, as for instance the following function f :
f(θ) = |+3θ〉 〈+3θ| (32)
defines the correlations ∑
θ
|θ〉 〈θ| ⊗ f(θ) =
∑
θ
|θ〉 〈θ| ⊗ |+3θ〉 〈+3θ| (33)
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which are weak correlations for UBQC since
f(θ) + f(θ + π) = |+3θ〉 〈+3θ|+ |+3θ+3π〉 〈+3θ+3π| = 1. (34)
But, these are not strong correlations since f is not a linear map, hence not a quantum channel.
This is the underlying reason why the two-server blind quantum computing protocol in [3] cannot
directly be used to achieve verifiable blind quantum computation - the two server setting uses
non-communicating servers for the preparation phase, and it is easily proven that the resulting
correlations are the weak correlations, for all strategies of the two servers. However, there exist
strategies which generate weak correlations which are manifestly not strong, thus the verifiability
theorems of the verifiable protocol in FK12 [5] cannot be applied. We will come back to the
two-server setting again later. The results of this section provide simple criteria characterising
the properties of the initial correlations between Alice and Bob, which must be guaranteed in
order for the overall protocol to be secure in a local sense. If we simply abstract the process
which establishes such correlations (rather than the end result) we identify the ideal functionality
which can be used by Alice to realize delegated quantum computation. This naturally leads us
to the composable security framework.
5 Ideal functionalities for blind UBQC
In the previous sections, we have characterized initial correlations and protocols which are
sufficient or necessary for stand-alone blindness of UBQC.
Here, we formalize the establishing of these pre-existing correlations by an ideal process –
an ideal functionality – which will then allow us to study other protocols which can be used
instead of the standard state preparation. In particular, we will give protocols which securely
realize the ideal preparation functionalities with lower demands on Alice.
5.1 Basic preparation functionalities
The most natural functionality which generates the weak correlations comes straightforwardly
from their specification:
Definition 8. The ideal resource called the random remote blind state preparation for blindness
(RSPB) has two interfaces A, and B, standing for Alice and Bob. The resource first selects a
θ chosen uniformly at random. Bob’s interface has a filtered functionality comprising a bit c
which Bob can pre-set to zero or one, depending on whether he will behave maliciously. If Bob
pre-sets c = 0, the resource outputs the state |+θ〉 〈+θ| on Bob’s interface. If Bob pre-sets c = 1,
it awaits the set {(θ, [ρθ])}θ from Bob, where [ρθ] denotes the classical description of a quantum
state, with the property that ρθ+ρθ+π = ρθ
′
+ρθ
′+π, ∀θ, θ′. If the states Bob inputs do not satisfy
the property above, the ideal functionality ignores the set Bob has input and awaits a new valid
set. Once the set is received, the functionality outputs ρθ at Bob’s interface. In both cases, the
resource outputs the angle θ at Alice’s interface.
It should be clear that the resource above has been tailored to establish exactly the weak
correlations. However, it will be useful to define another type of a functionality, which is
more in the measurement based spirit. Here, instead of receiving a specification of states, the
functionality receives a specification of measurements by Bob, and a system, which can be used,
using entanglement, to steer Bob’s state.
Definition 9. The ideal resource called measurement-based remote blind state preparation for
blindness (MRSPB) has two interfaces A, and B, standing for Alice and Bob. The resource first
selects a θ chosen uniformly at random. Bob’s interface has a filtered functionality comprising
a bit c which Bob can pre-set to zero or one, depending on whether he will behave maliciously.
If Bob pre-sets c = 0, the resource outputs the state |+θ〉 〈+θ| on Bob’s interface. If Bob pre-
sets c = 1, it awaits the set of descriptions of 8 positive operators {Πθ}, such that for all θ,
Πθ+Πθ+π = 1. Thus a pair of such operators differing by π constiutes a complete measurement.
Additionally, it accepts a system Bin in some quantum state, of the same dimension as the
operators Πθ. Once these have been input, the functionality chooses a random angle θ, and
performs the complete measurement Πθ,Πθ+π, and outputs the outcome (θ or θ + π) on Alice’s
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interface. If the descriptions of operators (or dimensionality of Bin) Bob inputs do not satisfy
the described properties, the ideal functionality ignores the set Bob has input and awaits a new
valid set. Once the set is received, the functionality outputs ρθ at Bob’s interface. In both cases,
the resource outputs the angle θ at Alice’s interface.
Both functionalities can naturally be defined for any even number of angles (then denoted
in parenthesis explicitly, e.g. MRSPB(8)), which we shall use later.
The latter resource allows for a larger set of options for a dishonest player. This is captured
by the fact that we can construct MRSPB from RSPB. It is a good warm-up exercise to prove
this. The protocol π = (πA, πB) is trivial - Alice does nothing and Bob presses the no-corrupt
button (sets c = 0). Recall to prove that the trivial protocol indeed constructs MRSPB from
RSPB we need to show the following identities:
πARSPBπB =MRSPB⊥B (35)
which is the correctness part, and we need to find the protocol which is the simulator σB, such
that
πARSPB =MRSPBσB . (36)
The correctness follows from the definitions of the resources, as both output the same thing in
the honest case.
To find the simulator and prove security, we will first introduce a steering-type lemma we
will be using throughout the paper.
Lemma 10. Let ρθ be any set of 8 states, parametrized by the 8 angles θ, such that for all θ
ρθ + ρθ+π = 2η, (37)
where η is a density matrix, independent from the angle θ. Then there exist a set of measurement
operators {Πθ}, satisfying Πθ +Πθ+π = 1, and a bipartite pure state |η〉12 such that for every θ,
the preforming of the complete measurement characterized by {Πθ,Πθ+π} on subsystem 1, and
obtaining the outcome θ + bπ (for a bit b ∈ {0, 1}), leaves the subsystem 2 in the state ρθ+bπ.
The probabilities of the two outcomes are uniform for any θ.
Proof. This is a relatively simple steering-type result. Let
η =
M∑
k=1
λk |ψk〉 〈ψk| (38)
be the spectral decomposition of η, where λk > 0. Then we set the state |η〉AB to
|η〉AB =
M∑
k=1
√
λk |ψk〉A |ψk〉B . (39)
Next, for every pair θ, θ + π, we define the following operators:
Πθ = 1/2η−1/2ρθ
τ
η−1/2 (40)
Πθ+π = 1/2η−1/2ρθ+π
τ
η−1/2, (41)
where η−1/2 =
M∑
k=1
1/
√
λk |ψk〉 〈ψk| 3.
First, note that Πθ + Πθ+π is the identity on the subspace where the state η has non-zero
support.
1/2η−1/2ρθ
τ
η−1/2 + 1/2η−1/2ρθ+π
τ+π
η−1/2 = 1/2η−1/22ητη−1/2 =
M∑
k=1
|ψk〉 〈ψk| , (42)
3Such measurement operators are intimately related to the so-called “square-root” measurements [37] appear-
ing in optimal measurements literature.
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where the last equality holds as η = ητ relative to its eigenbasis. If the support is not over the
entire state space, we formally append the measurement operator set to {Πθ,Πθ+π,1 − Πθ −
Πθ+π}, but the third outcome will never occur.
Next, we claim Πθ,Πθ+π are positive-semidefinite operators. To see this, we will fix the basis
to the set {|ψk〉}. In this basis, the operator is diagonal, and the matrix of the entire operator
can be written as
ρθ
τ ◦M, (43)
where M is a matrix with elements 〈ψi|M |ψj〉 = 1/
√
λiλj , which is just the outer product of
the vector (1/
√
λi)i with itself, and where ◦ denotes the entry-wise matrix product (sometimes
called the Shur, or the Hadamard matrix product). M is obviously a rank 1 matrix, with one
positive eigenvalue. Thus it is positive-semidefinite, but so is ρθ
τ
, and since the entry-wise
product of two positive-semidefinite operators yields a positive-semidefinite operator, the entire
operator is positive-semidefninite.
Finally, we consider the influence the measurement has on the leftover system. Assume we
obtain the outcome associated with Πθ, then the resulting (subnormalized) state is∑
k,k′
√
λkλk′Tr(Π
θ |ψk〉 〈ψk′ |) |ψk〉 〈ψk′ | . (44)
Then we have
Tr(Πθ |ψk〉 〈ψk′ |) = 〈ψk′ |Πθ |ψk〉 = 1/2 〈ψk′ |
M∑
l=1
1/
√
λl |ψl〉 〈ψl| ρθτ
M∑
h=1
1/
√
λh |ψh〉 〈ψh| |ψk〉 = (45)
1/2
√
λk′λk 〈ψk′ | ρθτ |ψk〉 = 1/2
√
λk′λk 〈ψk| ρθ |ψ′k〉 (46)
Plugging this back in the whole expression, we get∑
k,k′
√
λkλk′Tr(Π
θ |ψk〉 〈ψk′ |) |ψk〉 〈ψk′ | = 1/2
∑
k,k′
〈ψk| ρθ |ψk′ 〉 |ψk〉 〈ψk′ | = 1/2ρθ, (47)
where 1/2 is just the probability of that outcome. We get the analogous result for θ+π outcome
measurement, so the Lemma holds.
The lemma above can naturally be generalized to more measurement outcomes (and more
states we remotely prepare), but two will suffice in this work.
Now, the simulator σB is defined as follows. It has exactly the same Bob-interface as the
functionality RSPB, so if the distinguisher presses c = 0, it presses c = 0 on MRSPB, and
forwards what the functionality outputs. If Bob presses c = 1, it presses c = 1 on MRSPB,
and it collects the descriptions of states {(θ, [ρθ])}θ from Bob, and checks if the opposite states
(in terms of the angles) add up to the same state 2η (it awaits for a new valid set if not). If
so it uses the results of Lemma 10 to find the corresponding descriptions of the measurement
operators {Πθ}, (for the input states described by{(θ,
[
ρθ
]
)}θ) and it prepares the purification
of the state η, outputting one part of it to Bob, and inputs the descriptions of the measurement
operators, and the other part of the system which held the purification |eta〉 , to the resource
MRSPB. The resource MRSPB will perform a measurement as specified, and by Lemma 10
the joint state of Alice and Bob will be exactly the same as the joint state which would have
been achieved by the same actions using πARSPB. This finishes the proof.
The inverse claim, that RSPB can be used to securely construct MRSPB does not hold:
since Bob chooses what system to input to MRSPB, and since this is a quantum state, there is
no way for the simulator to exactly estimate which states it should request from RSPB.
The main reason why we are studying these local preparation functionalities is to substitute
the preparation part of the UBQC protocol, where Alice prepares individual qubit states in one
of the 8 states uniformly at random, stores the angle and sends them to Bob, with a functionality
which has lower requirements on Alice. This process can be abstracted as an ideal functionality
where Alice receives an angle, and Bob the corresponding qubit state if he is honest. If he is not,
since the quantum channels allows for no corrupt activity, the only thing Bob can do is apply a
local CPTP map to the qubit he receives.
This brings us to a strong functionality corresponding to strong correlations from the previous
sections:
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Definition 11. The ideal resource called the strong random remote state preparation (RSPS)
has two interfaces A, and B, standing for Alice and Bob. The resource first selects an angle θ
(from the set of 8 states) chosen uniformly at random. Bob’s interface has a filtered functionality
comprising a bit c which Bob can pre-set to zero or one, depending on whether he will behave
maliciously. If Bob pre-sets c = 0, the resource outputs the state |+θ〉 〈+θ| on Bob’s interface. If
Bob pre-sets c = 1, it awaits a description of a CPTP map E from Bob. Once the set is received,
the functionality outputs E(|+θ〉 〈+θ|) at Bob’s interface. In both cases, the resource outputs the
angle θ at Alice’s interface.
Two things should be clear. First, the resource above is weaker than RSPB, in that we
can use RSPS to construct RSPB - the protocol is again trivial, and so is the correctness of
the construction (as both functionalities have identical honest behaviors). For security, we need
to show that RSPS = RSPBσB (omitting Alice’s part of the protocol as it is trivial), and
this is easy. The simulator σB collects the map E and inputs the descriptions of the states
{E(|+θ〉 〈+θ|)}θ to RSPB (they are valid inputs) and forwards to Bob what is output.
Second, if we substitute the act of Alice sending a qubit to Bob in UBQC with RSPS , the
security proof does through trivially, as the latter is just a formal specification of the prior.
Moreover, this type of a strong preparation protocol also suffices for a verifiable variant of the
UBQC protocol [5], as we had clarified earlier. From the analysis of the last section, however,
the intuition should be that weaker resource should do as well.
Indeed, RSPB is a weaker resource than RSPS (it allows more options for Bob than RSPS)
thus it does not follow trivially that the UBQC protocol is secure if we use this weaker resource.
Furthermore, since MRSPB is weaker still than RSPB, again it does not follow that UBQC is
secure if MRSPB is used. Next, we show that by a simple tweak of the original composable
security proof of UBQC, we can substitute the “qubit generation and sending” with MRSPB
and still have a secure protocol.
To make this formal, we remind the reader that the original statement of security of UBQC
is that the UBQC protocol constructs the ideal resource SB of blind quantum computing, from
classical channels, single qubit preparation, and quantum channels. Now we claim that (classical
input - classical output) UBQC constructs S from classical channels, and calls to the MRSPB
resource.
Theorem 3. The UBQC protocol where Alice, instead of access to a quantum channel and a
random generator of |+θ〉 states, has access to the ideal functionality MRSPB exactly constructs
the ideal functionality SB. In other words, the UBQC protocol is perfectly secure.
Proof. We begin the proof by reproducing, verbatim, the protocol detailing the actions of the
simulator and the ideal resource given in the paper [12] as Protocol 2.
The basic idea behind this construction is that instead of sending |+θ〉 states, and computing
the declared angles δ from the computational angles φ′, Alice could have equivalently send halves
of Bell-pairs, and random δ angles. Then, the angle θ would be computed in run-time, and
Bob’s local state would be steered to either |+θ〉 or |−θ〉 by a local measurement. Specifically,
the projection of one part of the symmetric Bell-pair 1/
√
2(|00〉 + |11〉) with the projector
|+−θ〉 〈+−θ| , leaves the remaining system in the state |+θ〉 〈+θ| . Note, this is just a special case
of Lemma 10, as |+−θ〉 〈+−θ| is the transpose of |+θ〉 〈+θ| relative to the computational basis.
The outcome corresponds to the random bit r in the original protocol. Rephrased like this,
the “steering” variant of the protocol can be split into two parts – the preparation part (done
by the simulator), and the measurement part, left to the ideal resource.
To prove our theorem, it suffices to modify the simulator as follows: instead of preparing
Bell pairs, and sending half to Bob, it collects the system from Bob and the description of
measurement operators (as specified by the functionality MSPB) – this modifies step 1 of the
Protocol 2. It still outputs a random δ angle.
Later, it simply forwards the system, and the operators, for each system, to the ideal func-
tionality – modifying step 4 – and instructing it to apply the corresponding measurement –
visible in the modification of step 4.2 of Protocol 2. The modified protocol is given in Protocol
3. By Lemma 10, even in this more general case, the state obtained by Bob will be exactly equal
as in the real case.
The functionality MRSPB was designed with the SB functionality in mind, as it takes on
input a state and CP maps as well.
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Protocol 2 Protocol with SB and simulator
The simulator
1. For each column y ∈ {0, . . . ,m− 1}, and each row x ∈ [n], the simulator prepares a Bell
pair (|00〉+ |11〉)/√2 and outputs half at its outer interface.
2. For each column y ∈ {0, . . . ,m − 1}, and each row x ∈ [n], the simulator picks an angle
δx,y ∈ {kπ/4}7k=0 uniformly at random, and outputs it at its outer interface. It receives
some response sx,y ∈ {0, 1}.
3. The simulator receives n qubits, which correspond to the last (output) layer.
4. The simulator transmits all EPR pair half, all angles δx,y, bits sx,y and output qubits
to the ideal blind delegated quantum computation resource, along with instructions to
perform the operations described hereafter.
The ideal blind DQC resource
1. The blind DQC resource receives the input ρin and a description of the computation given
by angles φx,y at its A-interface, and all the information described in Step 4 above at its
B-interface.
2. For each x ∈ [n], it performs the first measurement of a teleportation of the input, i.e.,
for each x it performs a CNOT on the corresponding EPR half using the input qubit as
control, and measures the EPR half in the computational basis. It records the outcome in
ix.
3. If ix = 1, it updates the measurement angles φx,0 and φx,1.
4. For y = 0, . . . ,m− 1, repeat
For x = 1, . . . , n, repeat
4.1. It computes the updated measurement angle φ′x,y .
4.2. It computes θ′x,y = δx,y −φ′x,y. It then applies Zθ′x,y , followed by a Hadamard H and
a measurement in the computational basis to the xth qubit of the input ρin if y = 0,
and to the corresponding EPR half if y > 0. It stores the result in rx,y.
4.3. If rx,y = 1, it flips sx,y; otherwise it does nothing.
5. The ideal blind DQC resource performs the final Pauli corrections {ZsZx,mXsXx,m}nx=1 on
the received output qubits, and outputs the result at its A-interface.
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Protocol 3 SB with MRSPB resource and simulator
The simulator
1. For each column y ∈ {0, . . . ,m − 1}, and each row x ∈ [n], the simulator collects all the
measurement operator descriptions, and the states input by Bob.
2. For each column y ∈ {0, . . . ,m − 1}, and each row x ∈ [n], the simulator picks an angle
δx,y ∈ {kπ/4}7k=0 uniformly at random, and outputs it at its outer interface. It receives
some response sx,y ∈ {0, 1}.
3. The simulator receives the n bits, which correspond to the last (output) layer.
4. The simulator transmits all the received states, and measurement operator descriptions,
all angles δx,y, bits sx,y and output bits to the ideal blind delegated quantum computation
resource, along with instructions to perform the operations described hereafter.
The ideal blind DQC resource
1. The blind DQC resource receives the input ρin and a description of the computation given
by angles φx,y at its A-interface, and all the information described in Step 4 above at its
B-interface.
2. For each x ∈ [n], it performs the first measurement of a teleportation of the input, i.e.,
for each x it performs a CNOT on the corresponding EPR half using the input qubit as
control, and measures the EPR half in the computational basis. It records the outcome in
ix.
3. If ix = 1, it updates the measurement angles φx,0 and φx,1.
4. For y = 0, . . . ,m− 1, repeat
For x = 1, . . . , n, repeat
4.1. It computes the updated measurement angle φ′x,y .
4.2. It computes θ′x,y = δx,y − φ′x,y. It then applies the corresponding Πθ′x,y ,Πθ′x,y+π,,
measurement the xth system provided by Bob. It stores the result in rx,y.
4.3. If rx,y = 1, it flips sx,y; otherwise it does nothing.
5. The ideal blind DQC resource performs the final Pauli corrections {XsXx,m}nx=1 on the
received output bits, and outputs the result at its A-interface.
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We can now ask the question if the UBQC protocol, where Alice has access to RSPB is also
secure, and here is where we immediately profit from the composable framework: since RSPB
can securely implement MRSPB, UBQC in which Alice has access to MRSPB also secure, by
the composition theorems of AC (or UC). We phrase this as a corollary.
Corollary 3. The UBQC protocol where Alice, instead of access to a quantum channel and a
random generator of |+θ〉 states, has access to the ideal functionality RSPB exactly constructs
the ideal functionality SB - that is, it is perfectly secure.
To illustrate how these definitions and the main theorem can be used, for illustration, we
prove the composable security of the so-called two-server protocol introduced in the original
UBQC paper [3].
5.1.1 Composability of the two-server protocol
In this subsection we prove the composable security of the two-server protocol defined in the
original paper [3]. In this protocol, two non-communicating servers share Bell-pairs, and Alice
instructs one to measure its halves with respect to random angles. If the first server is honest,
this steers the second server’s system to a collection of randomly chosen |+θ〉 states. Alice, from
the outcomes of the first server’s measurements and her instructions knows the states server two
is supposed to have. From this point on, Alice continues the basic UBQC protocol with server
two.
Formally, we prove that the two-server protocol perfectly securely constructs RSPB using
the resource R which is a quantum channel, and the two servers. Formally, we have the following
lemma:
Lemma 12. Let π be the two-server preparation protocol. Then
R, B1, B2
π,ǫ=0−→ RSPB (48)
Proof. We model the setting with the promise of no communication between the two servers by
assuming that in the real protocol the two non-communicating servers are an untrusted resource
with the promises that they cannot communicate, and share an EPR-pair. From the perspective
of the distinguisher, this means that the servers have a D interface which the distinguisher can
access. B1 has a filtered functionality, a bit c1 which if the distinguisher wishes the server to
act malevolently, the distinguisher can pre-set to 1 (and zero for an honest behavior.) If c1 = 1
the server awaits the sequence of two-outcome POVM elements, described by pairs of CP maps
{(θ, {E0θ , E1θ , })} which fully describe B1’s behaviour for each θ he may receive from Alice. B2
also has a filtered functionality, a bit c1 which if the distinguisher wishes the server to act
malevolently, the distinguisher can pre-set to 1. In this case, the server awaits the description of
a map EB2 he will implement on his Bell-pair half before outputting it on his D interface. Server
B1 does not output anything. The correctness of the protocol, i.e. πB1, B2σ⊥R = RSPBσ⊥ is
trivial, by the local correctness of the protocol, as proven in [3]. For the security we need to
show the existence of a simulator σB such that πB1, B2R = RSPBσB.
Note that the simulator will have a simulated pair of interfaces B1 and B2 toward the
distinguisher. If the distinguisher pre-sets c1 = 0, the simulator presses c = 0 on the ideal
resource, and collects the output. Then, if the distinguisher pre-set c2 = 0 on the simulated B2
interface he simply outputs the state he received from the ideal resource. If c2 = 1 he obtains a
description of a map, which he applies on the received state from the ideal resource and outputs
that.
The only interesting case is if c1 = 1, in which case the simulator receives the descriptions
of the maps {(θ, {E0θ , E1θ , })}. In this case, the simulator computes the states:
{θ,
∑
m
ηθ+mπ,m} (49)
with
ηθ,m := TrB1
(
(Emθ B1 ⊗ 1B2)(
∣∣ψ+〉 〈ψ+∣∣
B1B2
)
)
(50)
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which are the states B2 would have in the real run of the protocol. These are legal states he
can input in the ideal resource, and after he does, he collects the output from the ideal resource.
Following this he either just outputs this state to the distinguisher (if c2 = 0) or additionally
applies the map the distinguisher input in the simulated B2 interface, before outputting. It is
easy to see this process is indistinguishable from the real protocol, by construction.
In the remainder of the paper, we use the results we have given thus far to show that
the capacity for Alice to prepare essentially any two non-orthogonal states, already suffices for
blind quantum computation. We do this by providing protocols which securely construct the
functionalities MRSPB (and RSPB) which use simpler resources.
6 Security from two non-orthogonal states
In this section, we will provide a protocol in which Alice just needs to be able to prepare two
non-orthogonal states, say |+〉 and |+δ〉 , for any angle 0 < δ 6= π, and which constructs the
functionality MRSPB. By the results of the previous section, this implies that access to this
resource (and, specially to a device which prepares exactly those states) suffices for Alice to run
a secure UBQC protocol.
We prove our results through a few intermediary steps. First we will show that a four state
measurement based functionality MSPB(4) suffices for the exact implementation of MSPB(8).
Recall, this functionality, when used honestly, prepares the four BB84 states ({|+〉 , |−〉 , ∣∣+π/2〉 , ∣∣−π/2〉}).
As we will be using variants of the functionalities we defined earlier, but which output all 8
states or just 4, we distinguish between them by putting the state number in parenthesis, so e.g.
MRSPB(8) and MRSPB(4) differ only in that the first implements the standard 8 states, and
the latter the four BB84 states.
Later, we will show that there exist protocol which allow Alice to implement MRSPB(4),
while having just the capacity to implement the two states |+〉 , ∣∣+π/2〉 .
Finally we generalize this to essentially any two non-orthogonal states.
6.1 Blindness from 4 states
First we claim that there exists a protocol π such that
MRSPB(4)
π,ǫ=0−→ MRSPB(8). (51)
We assume classical channels are always available, as usual.
It will be convenient to assume that when usingMRSPB(4), Alice has the capacity to choose
the angles, rather than have them output uniformly at random.
In general, for the functionalities RSPB(2N), the non-random variants, denoted SPB(2N),
(that is, the variants where Alice chooses her angles), can be efficiently and securely constructed
one from the other perfectly. One direction (‘chosen’ to ‘random’) has the almost trivial protocol
where Alice’s part randomly chooses an angle, and Bob’s side is trivial. The simulator is trivial
as well. The other direction RSPB(2N)→ SPB(2N), requires an additional resource: classical
channel capable of representing the 2N angles. The protocol of Alice accepts an angle as input on
the Alice’s interface, and the angle from the functionality RSPB(2N), and sends the difference
between the angles to Bob’s side. Bob’s protocol rotates the received quantum state by the
difference. This is easily seen to be a perfectly correct protocol. The simulator σB satisfying
πARSPB(2N)Rc = SPB(2N)σB, (52)
is given as follows. The B interface has the capacity to collect the description of the measurement
operators given by Bob (when c = 1), along with a quantum system, and to output a quantum
system and the description of an angle. It collects the descriptions {Πθ}θ of the measurement
operators, and chooses a random angle θ′. It modifies the descriptions of the operators to to
{Πθ−θ′}θ and inputs this into the functionality SPB(2N). If the first set of operators were valid,
so is the modified set. It collects the output from SPB(2N) and sends it to its B-interface
(corresponding to the B-interface of the functionality RSPB used in the real protocol we are
simulating), and the angle θ′ , on the part of the interface corresponding to the communication
channel Rc. It is clear that the outputs and collective behaviours of both the real and the
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simulated protocol are the same. Thus the random, and non-random variants of the preparation
functionalities are essentially equivalent. Formally we have
Lemma 13. There exist efficient protocols π and π′ (as given above) such that
SPB(2N)
π,ǫ=0−→ RSPB(2N) (53)
RSPB(2N),Rc π
′,ǫ=0−→ SPB(2N), (54)
where Rc is a channel capable of sending one angle.
For the measurement-based variants of the functionalities, we cannot expect that Alice’s
interface can accept any angle, as Bob’s side can choose the measurements and the measured
state. Recall, there the output on Alice’s interface depends on a measurement outcome, which
may in general be random.
However, we can guarantee that the outcome be one of two angles: θ, θ + π, thus Alice
can choose her angle up to π. We will denote such a functionality MSPB(2N). It receives
an angle from Alice θ, which directs the functionality to preform the corresponding complete
measurement Πθ,Πθ+π and return the outcome on Alice’s interface.
We again have that MRSPB(2N) can securely construct MSPB(2N) (using the same con-
struction for the non-measurement-based variants), but also the reverse, if we use additional
classical channels, as follows.
Recall, we are describing a protocol π = (πA, πB) such that
πAMRSPB(2N)πB =MSPB(2N)⊥B (55)
and the simulator σB, such that
πAMRSPB(2N)Rc =MSPB(2N)σB . (56)
The protocol proceeds as follows: πA receives a desired angle θ from its A−interface, and
collects a random θ′ from the functionality MRSPB(4). It then uses the channel Rc to send
the angle δ = θ − θ′ to the B-side, where πB receives it. πB then collects the (honest) state
|+θ′〉 from the B-interface ofMRSPB(4), applies the Zδ rotation to it, and outputs the resulting
state, which is clearly |+θ〉 , which is whatMSPB would output in the same setting. This proves
correctness.
To prove security, we construct the simulator σB as follows. The B interface has the capacity
to collect the description of the measurement operators given by Bob (when c = 1), along with
a quantum system, and to output a quantum system and and angle (from the interface of the
channel). It collects the descriptions {Πθ}θ of the four measurement operators, and chooses a
random angle θ′. It modifies the descriptions of the operators to to {Πθ−θ′}θ and inputs this
into the functionality MSPB(2N). If the first set of operators were valid, so is the modified
set. It collects the output fromMSPB(2N) and sends it to its B-interface (corresponding to the
B-interface of the functionality RSPB used in the real protocol we are simulating), and the angle
θ′ (given by two bits), on the part of the interface corresponding to the communication channel
Rc. It is clear that the outputs and collective behaviours of both the real and the simulated
protocol are the same. This proves the following lemma:
Lemma 14. There exist efficient protocols π, π′ (as given above) such that
MSPB(2N)
π,ǫ=0−→ MRSPB(2N) (57)
MRSPB(2N),Rc π
′,ǫ=0−→ MSPB(2N), (58)
where Rc is a channel capable of sending one angle.
Then, to show
MRSPB(4)
π,ǫ=0−→ MRSPB(8), (59)
it suffices to show that
MSPB(4)
π,ǫ=0−→ MRSPB(8). (60)
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where we assume that the classical channels come for free, hence we do not explicitly denote
them as available resources.
We now describe the protocol, which requires the functionalityMSPB(4) which prepares the
states {|+〉 , |−〉 , ∣∣+π/2〉 , ∣∣−π/2〉}(when used honestly), and where Alice can choose the bases of
the generated states (so chooses between |+〉 / |−〉 and ∣∣+π/2〉 / ∣∣−π/2〉 ) .
We describe and analyze the protocol for the honest case, which will prove correctness, and
show security later. Details of the protocol are given in Protocol 4.
Alice first uses 4 calls toMSPB(4) to generate 4 systems, denoted Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4, which are,
in the case of honest Bob, in the states:
Q1 = Z
a1Sa2 |+〉 (68)
Q2 = Z
b1Sb2 |+〉 (69)
Q3 = Z
c1Sp |+〉 (70)
Q4 = Z
c2S1⊕p |+〉 (71)
(72)
where a1, a2, b1, b2, c1, c2, p ∈R {0, 1}, chosen uniformly at random by Alice, or by the function-
ality itself. Note that the qubits Q3 and Q4 are in correlated states - the operator S chooses
the basis, and the two qubits are in two states of opposite bases. But note that the func-
tionality MSPB(4) allows Alice to choose exactly this. Alice asks Bob to apply S
†HS† to
systems and Q3 and Q4. This maps the four possible states, up to global phase, as follows:
(|+〉 , |−〉 , ∣∣+π/2〉 ∣∣−π/2〉) S†HS†−→ (|+〉 , |−〉 , |0〉 , |1〉). Alice then asks Bob to apply the Z(π/4)
rotation to system Q2. Finally Bob prepares a fresh system Q5 in the state |+〉 , and entangles
all the systems using control-Z as follows: Q1 with Q3, Q2 with Q4, and Q3 with Q5 and Q4 with
Q5. We thus have two effective computational wires from the input systems Q1 and Q2, leading
through connecting qubits Q3 and Q4 to the same system Q5. However, one of the paths will
be broken (depending on the bit p) as the Z-eigenbasis states do not get entangled using ctrl-Z
operations. The same trick is behind the “trapification” procedure in the verifiable variant of
the UBQC protocol [5].
Bob then measures all the systems in the Pauli-X basis, obtaining outcomes o1, o2, o3 and o4
which are sent to Alice. If p = 0, the final qubit is (up to global phase) in the state:
Qfinal = Z
c2HZc1⊕o2HZa1⊕o1Sa2 |+〉 = Xc1⊕o2Za1⊕o1⊕c2Sa2 |+〉 . (73)
If p = 1, the final qubit is (up to global phase) in the state:
Qfinal = Z
c1HZc2⊕o4HZb1⊕o3Sb2Z(π/4) |+〉 = Xc2⊕o4Zb1⊕o3⊕c1Sb2Z(π/4) |+〉 , (74)
and Alice simply computes this state. It should be clear that, since all measurement angles are
one-time padded by a choice of Alice, if Alice’s bits are chosen uniformly at random, then the
resulting states span all 8 angles. What remains to be seen is that for any choice of responses
of Bob, the number of choices of Alice, which are compatible with a fixed final angle θ is the
same for all angles. Only in this case will the distribution over the angles be uniform, which
is a requirement of the correctness. To see this holds, first note that the choice of outcomes
effectively map the choices of Alice to some other set of choices, bijectively. This implies that if
the distribution over final angles is uniform for some sequence of outcomes, than it is uniform
for all. Thus, it suffices to prove the distribution is uniform for the fixed of outcomes oj = 0,
for all j. Next, note that it suffices to show that the distribution is uniform for the case p = 0
(which yield the BB84 states) and, separately that it is uniform for p = 1 (yielding the same
states rotated by Zπ/4). Note that the expressions for the two cases are essentially the same,
and independent except for c1 and c2 which appear in both expressions with exchanged roles.
This implies that it suffices to prove that the distribution is uniform for just one choice, say
p = 0. We have that θ is in this case given by
θ = (−1)c1((a1 ⊕ c2)π + a2π/2) = (−1)c1((a1 ⊕ c2)π + a2π/2). (75)
We can immediately see that if we set c1 = 0, that the distribution over the angles when we
average over a1, a2, c2 is uniform, and it is also uniform if c1 = 1. Thus, it is uniform if we
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Protocol 4 Protocol for four states.
• Input : No input
• Output : Alice outputs an angle θ and Bob a qubit in the state |+θ〉, where θ is chosen
uniformly at random in {lπ/4|l = 0 . . . 7}.
Protocol steps:
• Alice’s round:
1. Alice uses MSP (4), such that it outputs to Bob (for Honest Bob) four qubits
Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4, in the states
Q1 = Z
a1Sa2 |+〉 (61)
Q2 = Z
b1Sb2 |+〉 (62)
Q3 = Z
c1Sp |+〉 (63)
Q4 = Z
c2S1⊕p |+〉 (64)
(65)
where a1, b1, b2, c1, c2 ∈R {0, 1}, chosen uniformly at random by Alice, and a2, b2, p
are chosen uniformly at random by the functionality, and reported to Alice.
• Bob’s round:
1. Bob applies S†HS† to systems and Q3, and Q4.
2. Bob applies Z(π/4) rotation to system Q2.
3. Bob prepares a fresh system Q5 in the state |+〉 .
4. Bob performs ctrl-Zentangling and X-basis measurement operations:
4.1. Bob entangles Q1 with Q3, measures Q1, obtaining outcome o1.
4.2. Bob entangles Q3 with Q5, measures Q3, obtaining outcome o2.
4.3. Bob entangles Q2 with Q4, measures Q2, obtaining outcome o3.
4.4. Bob entangles Q4 with Q5, measures Q4, obtaining outcome o4.
5. Bob sends the outcomes o1, o2, o3 and o4 to Alice.
6. Bob outputs the system Q5
• Alice’s round:
1. Alice computes
θ = (−1)c1⊕o2((a1 ⊕ o1 ⊕ c2)π + a2π/2), (66)
for p = 0, and
θ = (−1)c2⊕o4((b1 ⊕ o3 ⊕ c1)π + b2π/2 + π/4) (67)
for p = 1.
2. Alice outputs θ.
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average over all the parameters. The same holds in all other cases, so he protocol is perfectly
correct.
To prove security, we need to construct the appropriate simulator. The simulator will, for
the corrupt case c = 1, collect 4 sets of descriptions of measurement operators, one for each
qubit/system Q1, . . . Q4, and collect the systems input by Bob/the distinguisher for all of them
(recall the MSP functionalities accept also a system from Bob, and we have one call to them
for each system Q1 to Q4). The overall set of measurement operators input are given with the
set
{Πiθ}θ, (76)
where for each i = 1, . . . , 4 we have that Πiθ +Π
i
θ+π = 1.
Next, consider the function which Alice uses in the real protocol, to compute the realized
angle: If p = 0 we have that
Qfinal = X
c1⊕o2Za1⊕o1⊕c2Sa2 |+〉 (77)
so Alice computes
θ = (−1)c1⊕o2((a1 ⊕ o1 ⊕ c2)π + a2π/2). (78)
If p = 1 we have that
Qfinal = X
c2⊕o4Zb1⊕o3⊕c1Sb2Z(π/4) |+〉 . (79)
so Alice computes
θ = (−1)c2⊕o4((b1 ⊕ o3 ⊕ c1)π + b2π/2 + π/4). (80)
We can abstract Alice’s computation as the function f(a1, a2, b1, b2, c1, c2, p, o1, o2, o3, o4) ∈
{lπ/4}7l=0, which generates the Alice’s computed angle, and given by the formulae above.
The simulator proceeds as follows: it collects all the descriptions, the systems Bob inputs,
and the measurement outcomes (o1, o2, o3, o4) which are all input on Bob’s interface (as in
the real protocol). Then, for each θ in the set of all angles, it computes the set s(θ) =
{(a1, a2, b1, b2, c1, c2, p)|f(a1, a2, b1, b2, c1, c2, p, o1, o2, o3, o4) = θ}, where this set depends on
Bob’s reported outcomes. Note that the bits a1, a2 parametrize the measurement operators
for first system, b1, b2 for the second, and the three bits c1, c2, p, characterize the last two
systems as follows: for the first two systems we have that Π1(a1, a2) = Π
1
(a1π+a2π/2)
, and
Π2(b1, b2) = Π
2
(b1π+b2π/2)
. For the third and fourth we have that:
Π3,4(c1, c2, p) = Π
3
c1π+pπ/2
⊗Π4c2π+(1⊕p)π/2. (81)
We now claim that the operators
Πθ =
∑
(a1,a2,b1,b2,c1,c2,p)∈s(θ)
Π1(a1, a2)⊗Π2(b1, b2)⊗ Π3,4(c1, c2, p) (82)
form a valid input for the functionality MRSPB(8), in other words, that for all (o1, o2, o3, o4)
Πθ +Πθ+π = 1. (83)
We, however, already know that for all fixed a2, b2, c1, c2, and for all outcomes (o1, o2, o3, o4) it
holds that ∑
a1
Π1(a1, a2) = 1;
∑
b1
Π2(b1, b2) = 1, (84)
as they are valid inputs for the functionalities MSPB(4). But it also holds that for any fixed p
∑
c1,c2
Π3,4(c1, c2, p) =
(∑
c1
Π3c1π+pπ/2
)
⊗
(∑
c2
Π4c2π+(1⊕p)π/2
)
= 1⊗ 1, (85)
26
for the same reason.
Finally, by the analysis of the frequencies of (a1, a2, b1, b2, c1, c2), compatible with an angle
in the even parity angles {2lπ/4}3l=0 (case p = 0) and odd parity case (case p = 0) {(2l +
1)π/4}3l=0, we have that the cases where a1, b1, c1, c1 equal 1, and cases where they equal zero,
appear the same number of times, if we constrain f(a1, a2, b1, b2, c1, c2, p, o1, o2, o3, o4) = θ or
f(a1, a2, b1, b2, c1, c2, p, o1, o2, o3, o4) = θ+ π, for any θ, and any fixed choice of outcomes oj . To
see this, note that fixing θ only fixes a2, b2 and p and other parameters, in particular a1, a2, c1
and c2 are freely averaged over.
Thus the claim in Eq. (83) holds. But then the simulator can input exactly the measurement
operators
Πθ =
∑
(a1,a2,b1,b2,c1,c2,p)∈s(θ)
Π1(a1, a2)⊗Π2(b1, b2)⊗ Π3,4(c1, c2, p) (86)
into the functionality MRSPB(8), along with all the system it collected from its Bob-interface.
The outcomes will, by construction, result in the same state as in the real protocol, which proves
the security with zero error. Thus, we have proven the following lemma.
Lemma 15. There exist an efficient protocol π (as given above) such that
MSPB(4)
π,ǫ=0−→ MRSPB(8). (87)
By the previous reduction of Lemma 14, this also means that MRSPB(4) can be used to
exactly construct MRSPB(8), which will be important in the next section.
We point out that since SPB(4) → RSPB(4) → MRSPB(4), this also means that having
the capacity to prepare just the four states suffices for blind quantum computing with zero error.
The protocol is exactly the same as the protocol we provided above. There have already been
protocol proposed which achieve blind quantum computing using just four states [11, 16]. Next,
we show how to realize MRSPB(4) securely using just two states, which we believe is a new
result.
6.2 Blindness from 2 states
Assume that Alice has a device, resource SP (2) which randomly chooses between two states |+〉
and
∣∣+π/2〉 and sends them to Bob. We now give a protocol which, using SP (2) many (N = 2K)
times, constructs RSPB(4) securely, but for the first time with finite error ǫ.
This protocol is essentially a one-dimensional measurement based computation, where we
make sure that the qubits never leave the XY plane of the Bloch sphere. The qubits are sequen-
tially enangled, and one of the two is measured. This can be done such that the resulting qubit
is characterized by an angle which is the sum (up to signs which depend on the measurement
outcomes) of the angles of the two qubits. When this is done sequentially, the final qubit is in a
state whose characterizing angle is (up to signs) the sum of all the angles which appeared in the
initial sequence. The initial angles are chosen uniformly at random by Alice, and this process
constitutes a random walk on the unit circle of angles. This walk quickly approaches a uniform
distribution over all the angles which can be reached. The details of the protocol are given in
Protocol 5.
For this protocol we claim that
πASP (2)πB ≈ǫcorr MRSPB(4)⊥B (89)
and that there exists a simulator σB , such that
πASP (2)R2c ≈ǫsec MRSPB(4)σB. (90)
We begin with the proof of correctness, and in the process establish some properties which
will help us construct the simulator. To prove the ǫ−correctness of Protocol 5, since there are
no inputs to the protocol, it will suffice to show that the state σrealAB generated by utilizing
the resource πASP (2)πB is ǫ-close to the state σ
ideal
AB generated by one use of the resource
MRSPB(4)⊥B, which is given with
σidealAB =
∑
θ
1
4
|θ〉 〈θ|A ⊗ |+θ〉 〈+θ| (91)
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Protocol 5 Protocol for two states
• Input : Security parameter N = 2K.
• Output : Alice outputs an angle θ and Bob a qubit in the state |+θ〉, where θ is chosen
uniformly at random in {lπ/2|l = 0 . . . 3}.
Protocol steps:
• Alice’s round:
1. Alice uses SP (2) (outputting |ψ(i)j〉 = 1/2(|0〉 + eiπ/2 |1〉), to Bob and the bit i to
Alice) and generates N states, stores their encoding {ij}Nj=1.
• Bob’s round:
1. Bob applies the Z−π/4 rotation to each qubit.
2. Bob applies the 1DQC subroutine [6] to the qubits |ψ(ij)j〉 , for j = 1, . . . , N given
by the following:
3. For each j = 1, . . . , N − 1
– Bob applies a Hadamard to the jth qubit.
– Bob ctrl−Z to qubit j and j + 1.
– He measures the jth qubit with respect to the X basis.
– He stores the output in the bit bj, discards the measured qubit, and applies X
bj
to the (j + 1)st qubit.
4. From the bitstring b1, . . . , bN−1, Bob computes the bitsting tk =
⊕
j<k bk (⊕ denotes
mod 2 addition) and sends this bitstring to Alice.
• Alice’s round:
1. Alice computes
θ =
N−1∑
j=1
(−1)tj⊕ijπ/4 mod 2π (88)
2. Alice outputs θ
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We construct the state σrealAB , by going through the steps of the protocol. The protocol
consists of 4 interactions between Alice and Bob. The state of Alice and Bob after Alice’s round,
and Bob’s local rotation, is given with:
σ1AB = 2
−N∑
i
|i〉 〈i|A ⊗ |ψ(i)〉 〈ψ(i)| , (92)
where with i we denote the entire sequence of bits N specifying the state |ψ(i)〉 : = ⊗Nj=1 |ψ(ij)〉.
In the following round, Bob applies the 1DQC sub-protocol [6], which outputs N − 1 mea-
surement outcomes bi. From the outcomes, he computes the local corrections ti (Step 4 in the
protocol), and sends them to Alice. He traces out the correction bits. The joint state of Alice
and Bob is, after these steps given with
σ2AB = 2
−2N∑
i,t
|i〉 〈i| ⊗ |t〉 〈t|A ⊗
∣∣+θ(i,t)〉 〈+θ(i,t)∣∣ (93)
.
The angle θ(i, t) is given by the expression
θ(i, t) =
N∑
j=1
(−1)ij⊕tj π
4
mod 2π, (94)
where we take that tN = 0. Then, Alice computes the angle θ using the expression above, which
we denote as the function f(i, t) = θ(i, t), to clearly distinguish it from the angle itself.
Here, note that we have demanded that the total number of systems sent be even (N = 2K).
This implies that we have a sum of an even number of angles π/4, some of which come with a
negative sign. Since the total is positive, then either both the number of the plus signs and the
minus signs is even, or both are odd. Either way, the difference of their numbers is even. This
implies the angle θ will always be one of the four angles {kπ/2}3k=0. Note that if we had not
introduced the Z−π/4 rotation in the protocol, the end state would always be in the set of four
angles, but the influence of the corrections on the final angle would be slightly more difficult to
analyse - but since this is just a local unitary, if the protocol with the Zπ/4 rotation is secure,
so is the one without it.
Following this, Alice computes her angle value θ using the function f , traces out the irrelevant
information, and obtains
σrealAB =
∑
θ
p(θ) |θ〉 〈θ|A ⊗ |+θ〉 〈+θ| . (95)
The probabilities p(θ) are not perfectly uniform - they correspond to the fractions of se-
quences (i1 ⊕ t1, . . . , iN ⊕ tn) which map to a given angle θ under f . If we fix an arbitrary
sequence of corrections t, and introduce the i′j = ij ⊕ tj , we have that
f(i, t) = f(i′, 0) =
N∑
j=1
(−1)i′j π
4
mod 2π. (96)
For simplicity, we write f(i′) : = f(i′, 0) Note that since all sequences i′ appear in the joint state,
for a fixed set of corrections, we have that p(θ) = |f−1(i′)|/2N , where |f−1(i′)| is the size of the
set f−1(i′) = {i′|f−1(i′)) = θ}.
To specify this distribution we now explicitly compute the sizes of these sets for all four
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angles, and to make this as simple as possible, we reshuffle the expressions a bit. We have that
f(i′) =
N∑
j=1
(−1)i′j π
4
mod 2π (97)
f(i′) +Nπ/4 mod 2π =
N∑
j=1
(−1)i′j π
4
+Nπ/4 mod 2π (98)
f(i′) +Nπ/4 mod 2π =
N∑
j=1
((−1)i′j π
4
+ π/4) mod 2π (99)
f(i′) +Nπ/4 mod 2π =
N∑
j=1
((1− i′j)π/2) mod 2π (100)
f(i′) +Nπ/4 mod 2π = Nπ/2−
N∑
j=1
i′jπ/2 mod 2π (101)
f(i′)−Nπ/4 mod 2π = −
N∑
j=1
i′jπ/2 mod 2π (102)
Kπ/2− f(i′) mod 2π =
N∑
j=1
i′jπ/2 mod 2π (103)
(104)
Note that, in the left-hand side of the expression in the last line, we simply have a permutation
of the angle given with θ → Kπ/2 − θ, which depends on the choice of K. The probability of
Alice computing the angle lπ/2 = θ = Kπ/2 − θ′ is then given by the number of sequences i′
such that
∑
j i
′
j mod 4 = l, divided by the total number. If we, for the moment, assume that
K is even as well, so N = 4M , this is given by the following expressions:
p(0) =
∑M
h=0
(
4M
4h
)
24M
, for l = 0, (105)
p(lπ/2) =
∑M−1
h=0
(
4M
4h+l
)
24M
for l > 0. (106)
These can be evaluated to closed form expressions:
p(π/2) = p(3π/2) = 1/4 (107)
p(0) = 1/4 + (−1)M 2−K−1 (108)
p(π) = 1/4 + (−1)M+1 2−K−1. (109)
The odd-parity angles (π/2, 3π/2) have exactly 1/4 probability of appearing, and the other two
converge to 1/4 exponentially quickly in K = N/2.
Form the above, we have that ǫcorr ≤ 1/2
∑
θ |p(θ) − 1/4| = 2−2K−1 = 2−N/2−1. In the
analysis we have assumed that the number of the systems Alice uses is of the form N = 4M,
but in the case it is not, the decay is still exponential for any N , as the distance between
the distributions is upper bounded by 2−N
′/2−1, for the largest N ′ ≤ N, which is of the form
N ′ = 4M . This establishes the correctness within ǫcorr ≤ 2−N/2−1.
For the security of the protocol, we need to construct a corresponding simulator for which
the expression
πASPB(2)R2c ≈ǫsec MRSPB(4)σB (110)
holds.
To evaluate the distinguishing advantage ǫsec above, we will consider the structure of the
states Bob has in the real protocol ( after using πASPB(2)R2c), and the simulated protocol
(after using MRSPB(4)σB). Since the protocol has only two rounds and takes no input on
Alice’s interface, the set of distinguisher’s strategies consist of only of the choice of maps he
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applies (pretending to be Bob, at Bob’s round), followed by trying to identify which (real or
simulated) state he obtains. Before we can do this, we must first provide the simulator, and the
basic idea is to again use a steering-type approach, but this time approximate. First, we will
consider again joint state after a run of the real protocol, and re-write in a form which will make
the suitable simulator apparent. Following this, we will prove a couple of relevant properties
of the states Alice sends in the real protocol, which we will finally use to bound the distance
between the states realized by the real and simulated protocol.
Consider now the state joint state output by the real protocol, where we assume the dis-
tinguisher (on Bob’s side) applies any collection of CP (and trace non-increasing) maps {Et}t
which are a resolution of a CPTP map. Note, this is all the distinguisher can do at this point.
We obtain
σrealAB =
∑
θ
|θ〉 〈θ|A ⊗
∑
t
Et

 1
|{i|f(i, t) = θ}|
∑
i,s.t.f(i,t)=θ
|ψ(i)〉 〈ψ(i)|

 . (111)
Next, note that
|{i|f(i, t) = θ}| = |{i|f(i⊕ t, 0) = θ}| = |{i|f(i, 0) = θ}| = : f−1(θ), (112)
as i → i ⊕ t is a bijection between the sets in the second equality, and the first equality holds
by the definition of f . Next, let V (r), be the identity for r = 0 and the unitary map flipping
between |+〉 and ∣∣+π/2〉 (up to global phase), which is essentially the reflector about ∣∣+π/4〉.
Let U(t) := ⊗Nj=1V (tj). Now we have that∑
i,s.t.f(i,t)=θ
|ψ(i)〉 〈ψ(i)| =
∑
i,s.t.f(i,0)=θ
|ψ(i⊕ t)〉 〈ψ(i⊕ t)| =
∑
i,s.t.f(i,0)=θ
U(t) |ψ(i)〉 〈ψ(i)|U(t)†.(113)
Thus we can re-write the final state as
σrealAB =
∑
θ
|θ〉 〈θ|A ⊗
∑
t
Ft

 1
|f−1(θ)|
∑
i,s.t.f(i)=θ
|ψ(i)〉 〈ψ(i)|

 , (114)
where Ft = Et ◦ U(t), where the latter acts as Et ◦ U(t)(ρ) = Et(U(t)ρU(t)†) .
Let ξ(θ) =
1
|f−1(θ)|
∑
i,s.t.f(i)=θ |ψ(i)〉 〈ψ(i)| (which is a normalized state), and let
χ(θ) = 1/2(ξ(θ) + ξ(θ + π)). (115)
Now, we can apply Lemma 10 to represent the states ξ(θ) as the states of one partition of a
bipartite state, conditional on a measurement outcome of a measurement of the other partition.
Note that we only have two states χ(θ) (as we have four angles, and these states are averages
over states characterized by the opposite angles). In other words, the state χ(θ) is characterized
solely by the parity of the angle θ, defined as follows: if we represent the angle using two bits:
θ = b1π + b2π/2, then the bit b2 is the parity of the angle θ. Thus we can also denote these
states
χ(0) : = χ(0× π) = χ(π); χ(1) : = χ(π/2) = χ(3π/2). (116)
Let |χ(p)〉12 be the purification of the state χ(p), (for p = 0, 1) as in Lemma 10. Then Lemma
10 provides a pair of pairs of complete measurement operators Π(θ),Π(θ + π) (the descriptions
of which require only the descriptions of the states χ(p) and ξ(θ)), such that
ξ(θ) = 2Tr1 [(Π(θ)1 ⊗ 12) |χ(θ)〉 〈χ(θ)|12] . (117)
Note that we also only have two pairs of measurement operators, so if we denote the parity of
the angle with ⊕(θ) the joint state can be written as:
σrealAB =
1∑
p=0
∑
θ s.t.,
⊕θ=p
|θ〉 〈θ|A ⊗
∑
t
Ft (2Tr1 [(Π(θ)1 ⊗ 12) |χ(p)〉 〈χ(p)|12]) , (118)
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where we have broken the sum over the angles into the sums over even and odd angle parities.
The expression above is indicative to what the simulator should do. The simulator will prepare
an entangled state, and output one part on his Bob interface, and the other part it will keep. It
will collect the outcomes t, and submit exactly the measurement operators {Π(θ)}θ to the ideal
functionality. As we will show presently, the states |χ(p)〉 〈χ(p)|12 are exponentially close to
some two states |η′(p)〉12 , which both purify the mixture over all states Alice may send. There
are two technicalities we will have to sort out. First, the simulator does not know p as it is
chosen by the ideal resource - it can only prepare one state. Second, in the derivations of the
real state, we have also subsumed the maps U(t) which we still have to take into account in the
simulated protocol.
Both problems can be resolved by noting that two purifications of the same local state (the
one output on Bob’s interface, in our case), are always equivalent up to local unitaries (if the
purifying systems have the same dimensions). This means that the simulator can prepare any
state |η〉12 which purifies the state Alice sends in the real protocol, and deal with the correcting
local unitaries later.
We define then
|η〉12 = 2−N
∑
i
|i〉 ⊗ |ψ(i)〉 , (119)
and note that the reduced state η2 is just a uniform mixture over all the states Alice may send.
Now, as we show momentarily, there exist two other purifications of η2, denoted |η(p)〉12
which are close to the states |χ(p)〉 〈χ(p)|12 , (for matching p). But then there exists two local
unitaries, W (0),W (1) on the sub-system 1 such that
|η(p)〉12 = (W (p)1 ⊗ 12) |η〉12 . (120)
The simulator does not have the information to know which W (p) to apply, but this is not
a problem, as these can be subsumed in the descriptions of the measurement operators the
simulator inputs to the ideal resource.
The last thing we need to take care of are the local unitaries U(t), which act on system 2
(in the derivation of the state of the real protocol), and which depend on the outcomes of Bob.
By the same arguments, this too can be circumvented by applying a local operation on system
1, after Bob/distinguisher sends the outcomes t, as we have:
2−N (1⊗ U(t))
∑
i
|i〉 ⊗ |ψ(i)〉 = 2−N (X(t)⊗ 1)
∑
i
|i〉 ⊗ |ψ(i)〉 , (121)
where X(t) = ⊗Nj=1Xtj , and X is the Pauli sigma-X operator.
Combining the two resolutions (for W (p) and U(t)), we have the following behaviour of the
simulator. The simulator prepares the state |η〉12 , and outputs subsystem 2. It collects the
responses t from its Bob-interface, and submits the system in partition 1 to the simulator, along
with the following description of measurement operators:
Π(θ, t) =W (⊕θ)X(t)Π(θ)X(t)W (⊕θ)†. (122)
We have still not specified the unitaries W (p), and we shall do this last. Before doing so, we
will now simplify the expression for the trace distance of the final states of the real and simu-
lated protocol, where the simulator is given as above. By the construction of the measurement
operators the simulator provides, we immediately have that the state of the simulated protocol
is given with:
σsimulatedAB =
1∑
p=0
∑
θ,⊕θ=p
|θ〉 〈θ|A ⊗
∑
t
Ft (2Tr1 [(Π(θ)1 ⊗ 12) |η(p)〉 〈η(p)|12]) . (123)
We now compute ∆ = 1/2||σsimulatedAB −σrealAB ||. Since the states in Alice’s register are orthog-
onal, the distance breaks immediately into the sum over distances, and what remains is:
2∆ ≤
1∑
p=0
∑
θ,⊕θ=p
∥∥∥∥∥
∑
t
Ft (2Tr1 [(Π(θ)1 ⊗ 12) (|η(p)〉 〈η(p)|12 − |χ(p)〉 〈χ(p)|12)])
∥∥∥∥∥ . (124)
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Next, we can note that the partial trace commutes with the CP maps, and also that the
measurement Π(θ) can be absorbed into the maps (making them also angle dependent, which
we denote with F(θ)t), so we obtain:
∆ ≤
1∑
p=0
∑
θ,⊕θ=p
∥∥∥∥∥
∑
t
F(θ)t (|η(p)〉 〈η(p)|12 − |χ(p)〉 〈χ(p)|12)
∥∥∥∥∥ = (125)
∑
θ,⊕θ=0
∥∥∥∥∥
∑
t
F(θ)t (|η(0)〉 〈η(0)|12 − |χ(0)〉 〈χ(0)|12)
∥∥∥∥∥+ (126)
+
∑
θ,⊕θ=1
∥∥∥∥∥
∑
t
F(θ)t (|η(1)〉 〈η(1)|12 − |χ(1)〉 〈χ(1)|12)
∥∥∥∥∥ (127)
Next, note that we can sum the maps over t, still obtaining CP maps. Moreover, these maps
are trace non-increasing, thus they are contractive relative to the trace norm. Overall, we get
∆ ≤ 2 ‖|η(0)〉 〈η(0)|12 − |χ(0)〉 〈χ(0)|12‖+ 2 ‖|η(1)〉 〈η(1)|12 − |χ(1)〉 〈χ(1)|12‖ . (128)
What remains is to define the states |η(p)〉 (which implicitly specifies the map W (p) as well)
and bound the distances.
To do so, it will suffice to prove that the mixture over all states Alice may send is ǫ′ close to the
state Tr2[|χ(p)〉 〈χ(p)|12], for both p . Then, by Uhlmann’s theorem, there exist purifications
(|η(p)〉12) which are no more than 2
√
ǫ′ far from the states |χ(p)〉 〈χ(p)|12, for the respective
values of p.
First, define the states which are the even and odd parity mixtures:
ψp = 2
1−N ∑
i||i| mod 2=p
|ψ(i)〉 〈ψ(i)| . (129)
Next, by the results of the paper [38], Section 7, if the states Alice sent were either cos(α) |0〉+
sin(α) |1〉 or cos(α) |0〉−sin(α) |1〉, then the trace distance δ between the state which is a mixture
of all odd parity states, and the state which is a mixture of all even parity states is bounded by
δ ≤ | sin(2α)|N . (130)
These states (cos(α) |0〉 ± sin(α) |1〉 ) are unitarily equivalent to the states Alice sends in our
protocol for the choice α = π/8. This gives the trace distance ǫ′ ≤ 2−N/2 between ψ0 (mixture
of all even parity states Alice sends) and ψ1 (mixture of all even parity states).
Next, note that for the mixture over all states η = 1/2(ψ0 + ψ1) we have that
1/2||η − ψ0|| = 1/2||η − ψ1|| = 1/4||ψ1 − ψ0|| ≤ 1
2
ǫ′. (131)
Next, note that the state χ(1) = Tr1[|χ(1)〉 〈χ(1)|12] is exactly the state ψ1, so we immediately
have one part of the claim: the state η is 1/2ǫ′ close to χ1.
For the state χ(0) = Tr1[|χ(0)〉 〈χ(0)|12] we almost have the same claim, but not quite.
Recall that χ(0) is given with
χ(0) =
1
2|f−1(0)|
∑
i,s.t.f(i)=0
|ψ(i)〉 〈ψ(i)|+ 1
2|f−1(π/2)|
∑
i,s.t.f(i)=π
|ψ(i)〉 〈ψ(i)| (132)
which is not exactly the uniform mixture, as one of the weights is slightly larger then the other.
This was also the reason the probabilities in the correctness part of the proof were not exactly
uniform. To give the distance between χ(0) and η, we evaluate the distance between χ(0) and
ψ0, and we will have our claim by the triangle inequality.
We have that
1/2||χ(0)− ψ0|| = 1/2
∥∥∥∥∥∥
(
1
2|f−1(0)| − 2
−N+1
) ∑
i,s.t.f(i)=0
|ψ(i)〉 〈ψ(i)|+ (133)
(
1
2|f−1(π)| − 2
−N+1
) ∑
i,s.t.f(i)=π
|ψ(i)〉 〈ψ(i)|
∥∥∥∥∥∥ (134)
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Recall that, when we assume N = 4M , for N(l) = |{i|f(i) = lπ/2}| we have that
A(0) =
M∑
h=0
(
4M
4h
)
, for l = 0, (135)
A(l) =
M−1∑
h=0
(
4M
4h+ l
)
, for l > 0, (136)
which we computed (implicitly) in the calculations of the probabilities p(θ). Thus for the cases
θ = rπ, (for r ∈ {0, 1}) we get
1/2||ψ0 − χ(0)|| ≤
1∑
r=0
2−N+2
23M + (−1)M+r
∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
i,s.t.f(i)=rπ
|ψ(i)〉 〈ψ(i)|
∥∥∥∥∥∥ = (137)
1∑
r=0
2−N+2
23M + (−1)M+r (2
N−2 + (−1)M+r 22M−1) ≤ 2−3N/4+2. (138)
Again, we have assumed that N is of the form N = 4M, but the scaling remains the same even
if we do not.
Thus we have that 1/2||ψ0−χ(0)|| ≤ 2−3N/4+2. Since we have already seen that 1/2||η−ψ0|| ≤
1/2ǫ′, we have the following bound
1/2||η − χ(0)|| ≤ 2−3N/4+2 + ǫ′/2 = : ǫ′′. (139)
Then, by Uhlmann’s theorem, and applying it to both parity cases, there exists purifications
{|η(p)〉}p such that
1/2|| |η(0)〉 〈η(0)|1,2 − |χ(0)〉 〈χ(0)|1,2 || ≤ 2
√
ǫ′′, (140)
1/2|| |η(1)〉 〈η(1)|1,2 − |χ(1)〉 〈χ(1)|1,2 || ≤
√
ǫ′/2. (141)
(142)
The purifications are unitarily equivalent to the state |η〉 , up to the specifying unitary W (p) we
used in our derivations. Using this we can bound the overall distance of Eq. (128):
∆ ≤
√
ǫ′ + 4
√
ǫ′′ ≤ 2−N/4 + 4
√
2−N/2−1 + 2−3N/4+2 ≤ 5× 2−N/4 (143)
where the last inequality holds for reasonable values of N (but is exponentially decaying either
way).
We summarize this as the following theorem:
Theorem 4. The protocol π = (πA, πB), with security parameter N = 2K, as given in Protocol
5, securely constucts the resource MRSPB(4), using N calls to the resource SP (2), within ǫ,
with
ǫ ≤ 5× 2−N/4. (144)
We note that the construction of the simulator is also efficient, which matters if the protocol
is used in computationally secure settings.
Put all together, we have shown the following sequence of constructions:
SP (2)→MRSPB(4)→MSPB(4)→MRSPB(8)→ Sb, (145)
where only the first construction is not with zero (but exponentially small) error.
In other words, the capacity to generate the two states |+〉 , ∣∣+π/2〉 at random suffices for
Alice to securely implement a blind quantum computation protocol. To achieve final error ǫ,
for a blind quantum computing protocol of polynomial size, requiring M gates/qubits, Alice
needs to set the security parameter N = 2 log(M/ǫ), for each call to SP (2), so it is also efficient
whenever the computation is polynomial.
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In the analysis above, we assumed that the states Alice can generate come from the set
{|+〉 , ∣∣+π/2〉}, but the same techniques (and essentially the same protocol) can be used to
achieve security for the states of the form {|+〉 , ∣∣+π/(2K)〉}, for any K. In other words, the
overlap between the two states Alice can generate can be arbitrarily small (or, equivalently
arbitrarily large), causing only a logarithmic overhead in the angle (this holds by Eq. (130),
and the small angle approximation for the sinus function). In such a protocol it will not be
guaranteed that the final state ends up in one of the 4 BB84 states (or even the 8 states used
in UBQC), but this can be compensated by having Alice send an angle correction, bringing the
state to any of the target states. Instead of re-writing the entire proof in the more general form,
there is a more direct way to see that blindness can be guaranteed even if Alice has access to a
device which generates states with arbitrarily small overlap.
6.2.1 Blindness from states with arbitrarily large overlap
Here we show that blindness can be achieved by using two states |+〉 , |+φ〉 , where it holds that
the angle φ is smaller than 1/n, for any n. The basic idea is to show that for any angle φ, there
exists (a smaller angle) φ′ and a unitary U such that
U |+〉 |0〉 = |+〉 |+〉 (146)
U |+φ〉 |0〉 = |+φ′〉 |+φ′〉 , (147)
up to global phase. The sufficient criterion for such a unitary to exist is that the Gram matrices
of the input set {|+〉 |0〉 , |+φ〉 |0〉} and the output set {|+〉 |+〉 , |+φ′〉 |+φ′〉} coincide [39]. This
criterion is satisfied when
| 〈+|+φ〉| = | 〈+|+φ′〉|2. (148)
In other words, if Alice has access to a device which generates two states |φ〉 , |ψ〉, such that
| 〈φ|ψ〉| = √| 〈+|+π/2〉|, Alice can run exactly the same protocol as for the two states, where
she substitutes each |+〉 state with |φ〉 |φ〉 and ∣∣+π/2〉 state with |ψ〉 |ψ〉. She need only instruct
Bob to apply the unitary U to each pair, and the security is trivial as Bob could have generated
those pairs states from the states |+〉 , ∣∣+π/2〉 via an isometry.
This procedure of ‘halving’ the overlap can be iterated, and if iterated n times, we end up
with states |φn〉 , |ψn〉 such that
| 〈φn|ψn〉| = | 〈+|+π/2〉|1/2
n
, (149)
the overlap of which approaches unity exponentially quickly.
In terms of CQ correlations, this implies that a gadget capable of producing individually
asymptotically uncorrelated states of the form
σAB =
1∑
b=0
1/2 |b〉 〈b| ⊗ |ψb〉 〈ψb| (150)
where 1/2|| |ψ0〉 〈ψ0| − |ψ1〉 〈ψ1| || ≤ ǫ, for any ǫ, still suffices for UBQC. These states are arbi-
trarily uncorrelated in the sense that the trace distance between σAB and the closest product
state σA⊗σB is at most ǫ. This, naturally, does not imply that the overall correlations between
Alice and Bob can become negligible - Alice will need to utilize a significantly higher number
of such low-correlated states to achieve UBQC. We note that similar techniques to the ones we
have applied can be used to show that also highly correlated states, where the overlap between
the states Alice can prepare is almost (but not exactly) zero, suffice for constructingMRSPB(4)
and thus run secure blind quantum computation, and indeed, it is likely that protocols can be
constructed which achieve security using any two pure states which are neither identical nor
orthogonal. This should be easily provable provided that the angle between the states is not
irrational, as in this case, the additive orbit (all states that can be reached) achieved by summing
over a large number of such randomly chosen states comprises a finite set (and indeed in the
limit we achieve a uniform distribution over that finite set).
In the case of irrational angles, we approach the uniform measure over the real set of the
angles, which may require slightly more involved proof techniques. The simplest solution would
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be to approximate a discrete set, however, in this case errors must be taken into account, and
this may be problematic as they accumulate through the protocol.
The sensitivity to errors also holds true for the protocols we have presented. Any error
occurring on Alice’s side accumulates additively in the final states. Thus, for every security
level desired, one can, in principle, compute the threshold of local errors which can be tolerated,
such that the final UBQC computation, if run in a fault-tolerant fashion, still yields correct
computation. Recall that if we require M qubits for the UBQC computation, for security level
ǫ, we require O(2 log(M/ǫ)) states used in the construction of the resource MRSPB(4), which
is efficient as long as the computation itself is efficient (thus its size is polynomial in the input
size). Since the error is additive, the same expression provides a means to compute the local
error that can be tolerated: If we can tolerate error η per qubit in the UBQC computation,
then we require the error η′ ∈ O(η(2 log(M/ǫ))−1) for each system generated using the SP (2)
functionality.
7 Discussion
In this work we have studied the types of correlations which are sufficient for achieving blind
quantum computation. In particular, we have identified a class of functionalities which can serve
as a substitute for Alice’s capacity to generate single qubits in the set {∣∣+kπ/4〉}7k=0. Our primary
motivation for this was to understand what ultimate purpose the classical-quantum correlations
play in blind quantum computing protocols and to analyze whether such correlations can be,
asymptotically, be reduced to classical correlations. The results of this work do not establish the
impossibility of a fully classical blind quantum computing scheme - as we have clarified, proving
either the existance, or non-existance of such a scheme would have non-trivial consequences
in complexity theory, which suggests that coming up with such a protocol (if it exists) will
involve more advanced techniques. Nonetheless, this work does push the boundaries to how
restricted (in a certain sense) Alice’s devices may be. Using our constructions, we have provided
protocols which achieve security for blind quantum computing (in the full composable sense),
where Alice only has the capacity to prepare two states, the overlap of which can be arbitrarily
large - leading to arbitrarily small correlations per system. As a specific example, we show
the capacity to prepare the states |+〉 , ∣∣+π/2〉 suffices for the secure construction of the blind
quantum computing functionality Sb, with error ǫ which decays exponentially in the number of
states Alice uses. This we further generalize to show that states with arbitrarily large overlap
(arbitrarily small difference angle) also suffice for blind quantum computing.
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